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This MBA project conducts a comparative analysis of the Experimental Forward 
Operating Base (ExFOB) accelerated acquisition process created in 2009 to address the 
Marine Corps’ reliance on liquid fuel for expeditionary operations. This project examines 
the effectiveness of the ExFOB process in comparison with other acquisition processes to 
evaluate the ExFOB effectiveness toward reducing expeditionary energy use, and to 
identify the ExFOB’s value added to the Marine Corps.  
The findings of this study show that by accelerating selection, test, and evaluation 
processes, ExFOB has reduced the acquisition time of four energy-saving technologies, 
generating savings of approximately one year off of the two-year commercial off-the-
shelf process. The fuel saved by ExFOB’s accelerated process and the capabilities 
ExFOB has evaluated have the potential to reduce expeditionary energy use by 
approximately 26 percent by 2016 and keep the Marine Corps on track to meet its 2025 
goal. These improvements to the acquisition timeline and expeditionary capabilities of 
the Marine Corps, coupled with the value added, demonstrate that the ExFOB is 
instrumental in helping the Marine Corps improve its ability to conduct operations from 
the sea.  
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The Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) Program was created in 
2009 to address the Marine Corps’ increasing reliance on liquid fuel for expeditionary 
operations and the vulnerability to sustained operations created by fuel dependence. 
Using a small budget, the ExFOB program provides a means to rapidly evaluate and 
procure commercially available products in order to address a list of identified Marine 
Corps capability gaps. The goal of this project is to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
ExFOB process with other acquisition processes, measure the effectiveness of the ExFOB 
process and products toward reducing energy use, and evaluate the value added to the 
Marine Corps. To assess the ExFOB’s contribution toward a 50 percent reduction in 
Marine Corps expeditionary energy consumption, this project answers the following three 
questions: 
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the ExFOB 
program within different acquisition processes? 
2. What are the contributions of the ExFOB programs and process? 
3. Is the ExFOB value added to the United States Marine Corps (USMC)?  
Answering these three questions provides a well-rounded view of the ExFOB, 
allows an accurate evaluation of the program, and enables recommendations to further 
improve its effectiveness. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Throughout 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USMC has continually 
improved the way it maneuvers and fights against an evolving threat. Many of the 
improvements include new equipment designed to better protect the Marines and improve 
their ability to communicate on the move. Compared to the equipment allotment for a 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
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(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the current allotment includes  
250 percent more radios, 300 percent more information technology (IT) and computers, a 
200 percent increase in the number of vehicles, a 75 percent + increase in vehicle weight, 
and a 30 percent decrease in miles per gallon across the tactical vehicle fleet (U.S. 
Marine Corps Headquarters [USMC HQ], 2011, p. 8). With the exception of the reduced 
vehicle efficiency, these improvements to the MAGTF have resulted in a more effective 
force and less risk to the Marines carrying out their missions. Unfortunately, these same 
improvements have left the Marines more dependent than ever on a reliable supply of 
energy, mostly in the form of the liquid fuels required to power generators and vehicles. 
This dependence on energy prompted the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to 
declare in 2009 that efficient energy use is a top priority for the USMC. Later that year, 
the CMC established the Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O), whose task is to create a 
strategy for the Marines to address their increasing reliance on energy and to minimize 
the vulnerable logistics trail required to provide that energy. 
C. APPROACH 
Specifically, this project provides an examination of the contribution of the 
ExFOB program toward the USMC goal of reducing expeditionary energy consumption 
by 50 percent by 2025. We examine the USMC E2O, the ExFOB, the urgent universal 
needs statement (UUNS) process, and the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF) in 
order to gain an understanding of how the USMC and the Army conduct accelerated 
acquisition to respond to capability gaps as they are identified by warfighters. In addition, 
the project examines the ExFOB in comparison with traditional acquisition procedures 
specifically utilized by three processes—the Department of Defense (DOD) 5000-series 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS), the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) process, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS). This part of the project examines the results of combining these three 
processes into an integrated acquisition system. We then compare the acquisition 
timelines of the DAS, REF, UUNS and ExFOB processes. These comparisons enable us 
to analyze the performance of the ExFOB program itself as well as the capabilities the 
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ExFOB has selected, and to assess the value of the ExFOB program toward increasing 








In seeking to answer the research questions, this chapter categorizes the 
background information into five sections. The first section is an overview of USMC 
expeditionary energy strategy and goals, which helps frame the USMC’s approach and 
establishes measures of effectiveness for E2O and the ExFOB. The second section is an 
in-depth look at traditional acquisition and its components. This section also details how 
the USMC determined and documented expeditionary energy capability gaps which are 
the premise for the ExFOB. The next two sections detail ExFOB and REF processes 
which are compared in the analysis. The last section is an overview of the USMC rapid 
acquisition process. Understanding all aspects of the various processes and their 
differences as well as measures of effectiveness are important to the overall analysis.  
A. USMC EXPEDITIONARY ENERGY STRATEGY 
Energy has been a DOD topic of concern for many years but has not received 
much attention because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2009, however, the 
USMC made energy a top priority, so development of a long-range strategy and plan 
commenced (U.S. Marine Corps Energy Summit 2009 as cited in USMC HQ, 2011). This 
section draws heavily from United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy 
and Implementation Plan (USMC HQ, 2011). As a key part of the plan, the USMC also 
established the E2O in late 2009 (Office of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, 2009). The E2O is the lead proponent for the USMC; the CMC specifically 
chartered the E2O to “analyze, develop, and direct the Marine Corps’ energy strategy in 
order to optimize expeditionary capabilities across all warfighting functions” (USMC 
HQ, 2011, p. 5). The USMC strategy’s ultimate goal is to provide guidance for reducing 
the USMC’s reliance on fossil fuels in an expeditionary environment. Generally, this 
aligns the USMC with the DOD energy strategy and goals. 
The USMC, as well as other armed forces, has relied heavily on fossil fuels in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, a report estimated that the USMC used more than 
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200,000 gallons of fossil fuels per day and over 30,000 gallons per day at forward 
operating bases (FOBs) in Afghanistan alone. The reality is that the consumption has 
increased over time because capabilities have increased. Additionally, the energy needs 
in these austere environments are extremely high and logistically very difficult to 
support. The cost for liquids such as fuel and water in Afghanistan is also important to 
consider. The fully burdened cost includes, at a minimum, the following: fuel price, 
movement, protection, injuries and lives lost. Fuel has been, and always will be, a 
limiting factor for operations and can sometimes be a constraint; consequently, energy 
requirements will always be a concern for the USMC. The more the USMC can do to 
reduce its reliance on fuel, the more flexibility it will have to operate across the full 
spectrum of military operations. 
1. USMC Expeditionary Energy Goals 
As stated in the United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and 
Implementation Plan, 
By 2025 we will deploy Marine Expeditionary Forces that can maneuver 
from the sea and sustain its C4I and life support systems in place; the only 
liquid fuel needed will be for mobility systems, which will be more energy 
efficient than systems are today. (USMC HQ, 2011, p. 17) 
The USMC has numerous energy goals that encompass all aspects of its 
operations (see Table 1).  
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Table 1.   USMC Energy Goals (from USMC HQ, 2011, p. 21) 
Although the focus of the USMC efforts is on expeditionary energy, USMC 
senior leaders believe that changes in energy use start at home on the bases. These leaders 
believe that such changes are about changing the culture and the way that all Marines 
think about energy. Additionally, they plan to focus on water usage because water is 
closely associated with energy and is also an important logistical concern in an 
expeditionary environment.  
As seen in the first four goals listed in Table 1, the USMC’s first expeditionary 
energy goal is to change the culture by integrating energy into everything they do. The 
second energy goal is to have systems in place by 2015 for leaders to monitor and 
manage energy and water use in all USMC materiel (USMC HQ, 2011). This is tied 
closely to the third goal, which is to increase energy efficiency of all USMC materiel. 
USMC materiel includes weapons systems, platforms, vehicles, and equipment (USMC 
HQ, 2011). The USMC will improve existing systems and obtain new systems with more 
efficiency. The fourth USMC expeditionary energy goal is to increase renewable and 
2015 2020 2025
Increase Renewable Facility 
Energy (NDAA 2010)
Decrease Petroleum Consumption 
(SECNAV)
From 2003 to 2015, reduce energy 
intensity at installations by 30%
Through 2020, reduce water 
consumption intensity by 2% annually
By 2020, increase amount of alternative 
energy consumed at installations to 50%
By 2015, decrease non-tactical 
petroleum use by 50%
Meet Operational Demand With 
Renewable Energy
25% 40% 50%
Reduce Energy Intensity (EISA 
2007)
Reduce Water Consumption 
Intensity (EO 13514)
E2 Goals Efficiency Gains
Embed E2 Into USMC Ethos
Lead and Manage E2
Increase Energy Efficiency of 
Weapons Systems, Platforms, 
Vehicles, and Equipment
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storable energy resources for operational use in austere conditions. This latter goal will 
truly make the USMC lighter and more energy independent on the battlefield. The overall 
expeditionary goal is to increase energy efficiency by 50 percent and in turn decrease 
Marines’ daily fuel usage by 50 percent (USMC HQ, 2011).  
The USMC also has four non-expeditionary energy goals that are important to the 
energy strategy. These goals are centered around installations and are illustrated in the 
last four goals listed in Table 1. The first installation energy goal is to reduce energy 
intensity by 30 percent (Executive Order No. 13423, 2007). The USMC has already made 
great strides in reducing its energy intensity but has many more improvements to make to 
reach its goal. The goal will be attained by gaining efficiencies in all energy-related areas, 
including improving existing systems and replacing obsolete ones. In addition to making 
expeditionary energy improvements, the USMC will also establish an ability to monitor 
and manage energy. New technologies will replace old ones with state-of-the-art energy-
efficient characteristics designed to reduce energy usage and costs. The second non-
expeditionary goal is to reduce water consumption by two percent annually until 2020 
(USMC HQ, 2011). This goal will be reached by improving existing systems and 
replacing obsolete ones. The USMC will reinforce the importance of water conservation 
by promoting it on base and extrapolating it to the battlefield. The third non-
expeditionary goal is to increase alternative energy to 50 percent of total energy used on 
base by 2020 (USMC HQ, 2011). This goal will be reached by considerably reducing 
energy use and integrating renewable energy systems. The fourth non-expeditionary 
energy goal is to decrease non-tactical petroleum consumption by a 50 percent by 2015 
(USMC HQ, 2011). This goal will be reached by acquiring all types of alternative fuel 
vehicles and the infrastructure to support them. This goal includes the use of military 
bases that use petroleum to generate energy. 
The USMC plans to achieve these expeditionary energy goals incrementally 
because most of the goals will require time. Figure 1 illustrates a timeline to accomplish 




Figure 1.  Gallons per Marine per Day Timeline (from USMC HQ, 2011, p. 25) 
As actions are taken to achieve these goals, the USMC will see both short-term 
and long-term gains in energy efficiency, particularly with expeditionary water and 
energy consumption. The actions taken to achieve energy efficiency include the 
immediate improvement to existing materiel as well as efforts to change behavior. All of 
these changes start with leadership. The USMC’s long-term plan includes investments in 
research and development (R&D) and acquiring new technology to meet requirements. 
The USMC believes that these efforts will allow it to ultimately achieve its goals and lead 
to savings (USMC HQ, 2011).  
2. USMC Energy Initiatives  
The USMC operationalizes its expeditionary energy strategy with a whole-of-
service approach (USMC HQ, 2011). The whole-of-service approach examines every 
warfighting capability as explained in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System [JCIDS] (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2012a). The JCIDS is 
used to identify gaps in capabilities, so the USMC uses it as a guide for its expeditionary 
energy initiatives. The USMC categorizes its initiatives in the following manner: lead, 
man, train, and equip (USMC HQ, 2011). These categories serve as overarching themes 
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The USMC believes that the foundation to a successful energy strategy starts with 
leadership. The USMC will inculcate all Marines with the importance of energy 
conservation and efficiency in everything they do at home and on deployment. This effort 
will require all leaders to participate. Leaders will be given the tools to monitor and 
regulate energy use within their units. Collecting energy information is important to 
identify shortfalls and gaps and also allow leaders to maximize efficiencies. The USMC 
will also lead in expeditionary energy by establishing requirements for expeditionary 
energy, water, and waste (USMC HQ, 2011). The USMC will use the JCIDS process to 
make these requirements programmatic and invest in them. The USMC will also work 
with other services and agencies to ensure unity of effort and select the best methods and 
technology available. Leaders will promote a climate of innovation and a sense of 
accountability throughout the ranks so every Marine feels that he or she is a part of the 
initiative.  
The USMC is committed to manning and training the USMC. A key part of the 
expeditionary energy strategy is to have the right people and expertise in order to meet 
the energy goals. The USMC will ensure that all key energy positions are manned. Along 
with manning, training all Marines about energy is important. Training will occur in 
conjunction with new policy and doctrine and be instituted at all levels, particularly at the 
operational level. The training will ensure a fundamental understanding of the link 
between energy and combat effectiveness and lead to the USMC’s success in future 
expeditionary environments (USMC HQ, 2011). 
The USMC endeavors to be the leader in expeditionary energy. Through the 
various initiatives and equipping, it will attain this goal. Equipping the USMC with 
cutting-edge technology will give it the foremost warfighting capabilities to maintain its 
elite status. For materiel acquisition, the USMC will procure only the most energy-
efficient platforms and systems while maintaining the same performance specifications of 
current platforms and systems. If economically feasible, the USMC will improve the old 
systems to meet the new energy requirements. But, ultimately, it is about getting the new 
technology to the end user. Marines will test and evaluate the technology at home but 
 11
quickly use them on the battlefield, particularly with energy-saving and renewable energy 
requirements generated from Afghanistan.  
B. TRADITIONAL ACQUISITION 
The DOD traditional acquisition process is very complex and lengthy. The main 
reason for this complexity is that the process integrates three decision support systems in 
order to modify or acquire new materiel or services (Department of Defense [DOD], 
2013). These three systems are the JCIDS, the PPBE process, and the DAS. The PPBE 
process is used by the DOD to strategically plan and allocate resources. JCIDS is used to 
determine capabilities or requirements and then acquire those capabilities using the DAS 
(DOD, 2013). In short, the DOD identifies a need, funds it, and then acquires it, as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  DOD Decision Support Systems (from DOD, 2013, p. 3) 
These systems are all unique in terms of schedule, personnel, procedures, 
regulations, and oversight, which is another reason why the acquisition process is so 
complex and lengthy (Chyma, 2010).  
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1. JCIDS—Requirements 
The JCIDS is the process used by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) to advise the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in identifying, 
assessing, validating, and prioritizing capability requirements (CJCS, 2012a). The JROC 
actually oversees the process, and the Joint Staff J8 manages it. Services use a variation 
of this process to validate their own capability requirements when delegation authority 
has been granted to them. The JCIDS is the first step of the traditional acquisition 
process, and the result of this step is the creation of capability requirements.  
The JCIDS is an iterative process, as shown in Figure 3. Although this process 
can be tailored based on urgent needs or faster fielding, it generally occurs in four phases. 
Phase One involves requirements identification and document generation. In this phase, 
the service conducts a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) in order to assess capability 
requirements and associated gaps (CJCS, 2012a). From the CBA, an initial capabilities 
document (ICD) is generated to identify mission-essential capability gaps in the 
capability requirements. The ICD then leads to materiel and non-materiel solutions to 
those gaps. As the acquisition process advances, a capability development document 
(CDD) is developed, followed by a capability production document (CPD). 
 
Figure 3.  Overview of the JCIDS Process (from CJCS, 2012a, p. A-1) 
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Phase Two involves document staffing and validation. The level of staffing 
depends on the joint staffing designator (JSD), who indicates whether the capability 
requirements are unique to the service or are used jointly in multiple services. If they are 
joint capabilities, then the document staffing and validation flows from the sponsor to the 
JROC or the Joint Capabilities Board. If the capability is unique to the service, the 
service has validation authority. The staffing and validation of the ICD, CDD, and CPD 
also vary depending on urgency and technical complexity. For example, with commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) items, an ICD may lead directly to a CPD because development is 
minimal or unnecessary. 
Phase Three involves post-validation processes and interactions. In this phase, 
materiel and non-materiel solutions activities begin. The materiel solution starts the DAS 
process, and a draft CDD and CPD are generated accordingly. The CDD and CPD then 
return to the staffing and validation phase.  
Phase Four involves joint prioritization. This is the JROC’s and CJCS’s 
responsibility and requires capability prioritization for decision-makers. Each functional 
capability board also prioritizes capability requirements into joint priority. This is done to 
facilitate staffing but can be time-consuming. The priority is important because it 
determines what gets resourced in the PPBE process. 
The gatekeeper plays a key role in the JCIDS process because he or she manages 
the overall flow of documents for staffing and validation (CJCS, 2012b). This role as well 
as the entire JCIDS process has improved in the last few years. In the past, the Joint Staff 
J8 advertised four to six months as the average duration each time a document was sent 
through for validation. Another source claimed that the process took nine to 12 months, 
depending on the JSD (Chyma, 2010). Figure 4 shows the changes and improvements to 
the staffing and validation portion of the JCIDS process. 
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Figure 4.  JCIDS Staffing and Validation Process (from Willis, 2012) 
Compared to the old process, the new deliberate process essentially cuts the 
process duration by a quarter to a half. Although this is a big improvement, it does not 
improve the overall process by much because of the interaction with the DAS and the 
PPBE process. The deliberate (traditional) process still needs between two and six or 
more years, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Three Requirements “Lanes” (from Willis, 2012) 
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The three requirements lanes are deliberate, emergent, and urgent, with certain 
criteria to use each lane. The traditional or deliberate process is used when technology 
development is significant or the capability is not time sensitive—essentially, there is no 
wartime need. It is important to note the timing for the staffing and validation process 
because this does factor into the overall process duration. The urgent and emergent lanes 
fall under rapid acquisition and are covered in the rapid acquisition section. 
Also intertwined within the JCIDS process is the USMC role. The USMC is 
actively involved and leading the CBA and any documents resulting from the CBA. 
These documents are then reviewed on a deliberate schedule for all USMC requirements 
called the “Solutions Analysis Process” (Magnus, 2008). For example, the ICD which 
results from the CBA goes through three distinct steps (Magnus, 2008): 
1. Step one: Conduct doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership 
and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis from 
October of even years to January of odd years 
2. Step two: Implement solution planning directive (SPD) from February to 
May of odd years 
3. Step three: Develop MAGTF requirements list from June to August of odd 
years 
This process culminates in MROC approval and then proceeds through the JCIDS 
staffing and validation process as described above. The process is also iterative so it will 
occur two more times for the CDD and CPD. 
a. CBA 
The JCIDS initiates the early acquisition process and also interacts throughout the 
process with the DAS and PPBE. In the initial stage of the process, a capabilities-based 
assessment (CBA) is conducted on USMC expeditionary energy, water, and waste 
requirements. The CBA team considers the current strategic guidance as well as the full 
spectrum of operations to be assessed. The objective of the CBA is to identify gaps in the 
capability gaps and solutions to those gaps. Usually these gaps result in an ICD, which 
leads to materiel or non-materiel solutions to capability gaps. 
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The Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) sponsored a CBA to document capability 
gaps and solutions for USMC expeditionary energy, water, and waste requirements. The 
CBA’s objective was to meet the goals of the USMC expeditionary energy strategy: to 
reduce the fuel used per Marine by 50 percent, improve water self-sufficiency, and better 
manage waste (U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office [USMC E2O], 2011). 
The CBA team consisted of various leaders throughout the USMC, other services, and 
partners. The scope of the CBA looked specifically at operations originating from the sea 
and the first 120 days on land. The CBA team concentrated only on these criteria because 
the U.S. Army was simultaneously conducting a study of enduring operations on land. As 
shown in Figure 6, the CBA team’s method for assessing operations involved identifying 
capability gaps, assessing risk, and recommending solutions. The CBA team concluded 
its assessment by providing materiel and non-materiel solutions in the corresponding 
ICD, which we detail in the next section. 
 
Figure 6.  CBA Flow Process (from USMC E2O, 2011, p. E-2). 
b. ICD 
The ICD is a product of the JCIDS and a key document in the JCIDS process. 
This section draws heavily from USMC Initial Capabilities Document for Expeditionary 
 17
Energy, Water, and Waste, which was completed in September 2011. The ICD is 
organized as a concept of operations (CONOPS) with the objective of forming the 
intellectual base for capabilities-based planning to accomplish the goals in the USMC 
expeditionary energy strategy (USMC E2O, 2011). This section summarizes key findings 
in the E2O-sponsored ICD and discusses the way ahead. 
The CBA team examined expeditionary energy, water, and waste across a range 
of expeditionary operations. From these expeditionary operations, the CBA team 
identified the required capabilities. The team then determined tasks and other actions that 
would be needed to achieve those capabilities. Twenty-nine tasks were defined within the 
three expeditionary energy lines of operation: procurement of new technology and 
improvement of existing materiel, increased renewable energy use, and an ethos that 
associates energy and water with battlefield effectiveness (USMC HQ, 2011). These 
tasks are both institutional and operational.  
Once the CBA team identified required capabilities, it could then identify 
capability gaps. The CBA team combined the USMC expeditionary energy strategy with 
lessons learned and CONOPS developed for the CBA in order to set standards for gap 
and risk assessment (USMC E2O, 2011). The assessment resulted in the identification of 
152 capability gaps. Gaps were categorized in the following manner: policy, sufficiency, 
proficiency, lack of capability, need for replacement, or recapitalization (USMC E2O, 
2011). The CBA team also ranked the gaps in priority order with the corresponding tasks 
and capability requirements. (See the ICD in USMC E2O [2011] for further detail). After 
identifying the gaps, the CBA team proposed non-materiel and materiel solutions to 
address the gaps.  
(1) Non-Materiel Solutions.  The CBA team recommended 160 non-materiel 
solutions that have both short- and long-term effects (USMC E2O, 2011). Many of these 
solutions involve institutional changes that can quickly mitigate some of the identified 
capability gaps. The first recommended institutional change starts with USMC policy. 
We highlighted some of the policy changes and additions in the preceding USMC 
expeditionary energy strategy section, but the CBA team identified more during their 
assessment. For example, one change requires that energy policies be published to guide 
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the JCIDS process. Also, new policies on water use and batteries need to be 
implemented. The bottom line is that policies will be published to help solve all of the 
capability gaps.  
The CBA team used the DOTMLPF to categorize the other non-materiel 
solutions. Overall, current USMC doctrine was found to be deficient in the areas of 
energy, water, and waste. Future doctrine will address these areas and provide guidance 
to USMC personnel on constructing efficient FOBs and conducting expeditionary 
operations (USMC E2O, 2011). The organization category will also be updated to 
account for the expeditionary energy, water, and waste requirements. These solutions 
involve manpower and specifically target tables of organization and equipment, which 
are the organizational tools that establish the staffing and equipping of units. Training is 
also a fundamental solution to the capability gaps. Training will be updated to include 
general awareness, planning, and management of expeditionary energy, water, and waste 
for current and future operations (USMC E2O, 2011). Changes in training will also be 
made to individual specialties to account for the new capabilities. Generally, training in 
the areas of energy, water, and waste will be integrated into all administrative and 
operational environments. Personnel changes are also required as part of the solution. 
Following closely with organizational tools, these changes involve in-depth changes to 
manpower and tasking, including establishing new and modifying current military 
occupational specialties in the areas of expeditionary energy, water, and waste. The 
proper personnel will be assigned to units in order to meet new requirements and manage 
new capabilities. In regard to facilities, the expeditionary solution is quite simple and 
involves designing models of scalable FOBs for various types of missions and durations 
(USMC E2O, 2011). Leadership is the key element to implementing these solutions 
because it will require everyone to make these changes effective. Additionally, education 
across the USMC at the individual and unit levels will be needed to change the culture 
and achieve the USMC expeditionary energy, water, and waste goals. 
(2) Materiel Solutions.  The expeditionary energy, water, and waste capability 
gaps that could not be solved by the non-materiel solutions were potentially solved with 
materiel solutions. The CBA team identified 87 materiel solutions, which are categorized 
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by one of the following: IT, evolutionary development, and transformational (USMC 
E2O, 2011). The 87 materiel solutions relate to 27 of the 29 tasks mentioned previously 
(USMC E2O, 2011). These solutions were in addition to 22 materiel solutions that were 
discovered through other research (USMC E2O, 2011). Based on the distribution of 
capability gaps within the categories, many existing and planned initiatives will meet the 
capability gaps but much more is needed in the IT realm. 
IT is a critical part of the expeditionary energy, water, and waste capabilities. 
Better IT will allow leaders to monitor and manage energy and water consumption. IT 
will also provide a database for all users to store analytical information. These are just a 
few of the IT solutions.  
Evolutionary development involves materiel solutions that change or upgrade 
existing technologies for better performance or capability. For example, one approach is 
to modify COTS items for use in expeditionary environments (USMC E2O, 2011). 
Evolutionary development also includes approaches to solutions in the following areas 
(USMC E2O, 2011): 
 develop renewable power systems for unit and individual use, 
 develop FOB modules for efficient utilities support, and 
 develop and field water test kits or upgrade existing kits.  
The USMC uses other evolutionary solutions, but we have highlighted these 
approaches here because of solutions completed in these areas. The ExFOB is involved in 
these materiel solutions, which is discussed further in the ExFOB section.  
The transformational approach involves developing new technologies as an 
approach to materiel solutions. For example, one approach is to develop “hybrid”-fuel-
burning generators that have storage and renewable-energy capabilities (USMC E2O, 
2011). All of the approaches in this category are cutting edge and essential to achieve the 
USMC expeditionary energy, water, and waste goals. The ExFOB is involved with these 
materiel solutions as well.  
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2. PPBE—Resourcing 
The PPBE process is how the DOD allocates resources. This is a very complex 
and lengthy process that requires particular attention to the timing of events. The 
priorities of the DOD are balanced with fiscal constraints, and this balance is conducted 
through a four-phase overlapping process (DOD, 2013). The four phases are planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution.  
The planning phase involves the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, 
and DOD components. Their efforts are led by the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 
which incorporates the national strategies within fiscal limits. The phase results in the 
following: “guidance and priorities for military forces, modernization, readiness and 
sustainability, and supports business processes and infrastructure activities” (“PPBE 
Process: Planning Phase,” n.d.).  
The programming phase involves a response to the DPG by the DOD 
components. As part of the response, the components develop program objective 
memorandums (POMs). The POM describes the proposed programs and a time-phased 
allocation of resources by program for a five-year period (DOD, 2013). All of the POMs 
are reviewed and eventually integrated into a comprehensive defense program. This 
program then results in the defense budget and the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP).  
The budgeting phase and programming phase occur simultaneously, as suggested 
previously. With each POM submitted, a budget estimate submission (BES) is also 
submitted. The budget is only for one year, and the BES provides more detail so it can be 
reviewed. The final version of the budget is then incorporated into the defense budget and 
FYPD.  
The execution phase also occurs concurrently with the budgeting and 
programming phases. In this phase, a review of new and previous programs is conducted. 
From the review, program adjusting or restructuring may occur (DOD, 2013).  
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PPBE is a biennial cycle, which complicates the entire PPBE process even more. 
The PPBE process is done to support a two-year budget. In even years, also called on 
years, the budget is submitted to align with the DOD budget that is part of the President’s 
budget to Congress. However, Congress only appropriates annual defense budgets so an 
amended budget has to be submitted in the odd years, called off years, for the subsequent 
year’s appropriation. The off years are very restrictive in that only minor program or 
budget adjustments can be made (DOD, 2013). Therefore, timing of this process is very 
important with respect to new requirements, and components need to focus on the on 
years in order to minimize the overall time. Figure 7 illustrates the overlapping budget 
cycles. 
 
Figure 7.  Overlapping Budget Cycles (from Minstral, 2013).  
3. Defense Acquisition System 
Once a CBA has been completed and an ICD directing a materiel solution has 
been generated through the JCIDS process, the USMC uses the DAS to deliver the 




Figure 8.  Generic Acquisition Phases and Decision Points (from Kendall, 
2013, p. 7) 
The majority of weapons systems and support equipment that are not heavily 
reliant on technology use the framework outlined by Figure 9 to develop, test, produce, 
and support the newly acquired capability. 
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Figure 9.  Hardware Intensive Program (from Kendall, 2013, p. 9) 
Once a materiel solution has been directed, the first step in acquiring a new 
capability is to perform the materiel solution analysis. This phase is entered when the 
milestone decision authority (MDA) makes the material development decision. By 
making this decision, the MDA approves the analysis of alternatives study guidance 
(which directs the examination of the best way to meet the capability gap), determines the 
acquisition phase of entry and identifies the initial review milestone, among other things 
(Kendall, 2013, p. 15).  
During the materiel solutions analysis phase, the team conducts the analysis of 
alternatives (AoA). The AoA focuses “on identification and analysis of alternatives; 
measures of effectiveness; key trades between cost and capability; total life cycle cost, 
including sustainment; schedule; concepts of operations; and overall risk” (Kendall, 
2013, p. 16). The program is ready to move out of the Materiel Solutions Analysis phase 
when the responsible DOD component has completed the work necessary to support 
proceeding “to the next decision point and desired phase in the acquisition process” 
(Kendall, 2013, p. 16). Assuming that the program is going to require the complete 
acquisition process to fulfill the validated requirement, the next step is to complete 
Milestone A and move the program into the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction 
(TMRR) phase.  
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The Milestone A decision is approved by the MDA after the responsible program 
manager (PM) and DOD component present their acquisition plan for “the preferred 
material solution including: the Acquisition Strategy, the business approach, an 
assessment of program risk and how specific technology development and other risk 
mitigation activities will reduce the risk to acceptable levels, and appropriate ‘should cost 
management’ targets,” as well as an assessment of the component’s budgetary ability to 
sustain the program over its life cycle (Kendall, 2013, p. 17). 
The TMRR phase is in place to “reduce technology, engineering, integration, and 
life cycle cost risk to the point that a decision to contract for EMD [Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development] can be made with confidence in successful program 
execution for development, production, and sustainment” (Kendall, 2013, p. 18). The 
actions in this phase will usually involve competitive technology sourcing, prototyping 
(of the entire system or selected critical components) and demonstrations. While the 
technology matures (and while early design decisions are still being made), the PM 
updates the acquisition strategy and begins planning for the sustainment phase of the 
program. Also during this phase, all stakeholders validate the CDD to ensure that the 
technology being developed will deliver the required capabilities in an effective and 
affordable way. Once the CDD is validated, a request for proposal is released, allowing 
contractors to make bids for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
phase. Before the EMD contracts are awarded, a preliminary design review is conducted 
to gauge “the maturity of the preliminary design supported by the results of requirements 
trades, prototyping, and critical technology demonstrations” (Kendall, 2013, p. 87) and to 
ensure that the system is ready to pass Milestone B and move to the EMD phase.  
The completion of Milestone B is required for entry into the EMD phase and is 
the true initiation of an acquisition program. After the MDA is satisfied that “all sources 
of risk have been adequately mitigated,” it approves program initiation and the DOD 
components use of funding resources for the program, low-rate initial production (LRIP) 
quantities, and exit criteria for the next phase (Kendall, 2013, p. 23).  
The EMD phase is composed of two parts: completion of the detailed design and 
developmental test and evaluation (DT&E). The design phase is based around the 
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systems engineering process and may necessitate multiple iterations and prototypes 
before the initial design reaches a final version that adequately fulfills the project 
requirements. Once the design is finalized, DT&E events are used to make sure the 
system can “provide effective combat capability, including its ability to meet its validated 
and derived capability requirements” (Kendall, 2013, p. 24). The production-
representative prototypes used for successful DT&E are the basis for starting LRIP and/or 
limited deployment. The system moves on to the next phase  
when: (1) the design is stable; (2) the system meets validated capability 
requirements demonstrated by developmental and initial operational 
testing as required in the TEMP [Test and Evaluation Master Plan]; (3) 
manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated and are 
under control; (4) industrial production capabilities are reasonably 
available; and (5) the system has met or exceeds all directed EMD Phase 
exit criteria and Milestone C entrance criteria. (Kendall, 2013, p. 25) 
Milestone C is a critical decision point for a system in the acquisition process. 
This is the point where a program is reviewed and approved to begin the production and 
deployment phase (Kendall, 2013, p. 26). Because much of the program’s cost is 
generated in this phase, the entrance requirements to pass Milestone C are high. In 
addition to meeting the criteria laid out in Milestone B, there must be the following:  
An updated and approved Acquisition Strategy; demonstration that the 
production design is stable and will meet stated and derived requirements 
based on acceptable performance in developmental test; an operational 
assessment; mature software capability consistent with the software 
development schedule; no significant manufacturing risks; a validated 
Capability Production Document or equivalent requirements document; 
demonstrated interoperability; demonstrated operational supportability; 
costs within affordability caps; full funding in the FYDP; and properly 
phased production ramp up and/or fielding support. (Kendall, 2013, p. 26) 
As the name implies, the production and deployment phase is where the product is 
produced and delivered to operational units. Depending on the type and quantity of the 
system being produced, this phase may be broken into smaller parts in order to mitigate 
the risks associated with acquiring large numbers of expensive items. These parts may 
include LRIP, limited deployment, operational test and evaluation (OT&E), and the full-
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rate production decision or full deployment decision followed by full-rate production or 
deployment (Kendall, 2013, p. 27).  
An initial run of LRIP items has multiple benefits. Initially producing only a small 
number of items allows a smooth transition to full-scale production and provides OT&E 
test samples. In the event that changes are required, these OT&E samples can provide 
critical feedback about the performance and production processes before too many out-
of-spec units are produced. 
Using the items produced during either EMD or LRIP to conduct OT&E is the 
final chance to evaluate the production items in the threat environment they were 
designed for. If no pre-production or LRIP samples are made, then the contractor must 
provide samples from the production process. In either case, the MDA will use the results 
of the OT&E to determine if the program is ready for full-rate production or full 
deployment. 
Once the item has successfully completed OT&E and any remaining deficiencies 
have been corrected, the MDA authorizes full-rate production or full deployment. The 
remaining items are then produced and delivered, or full deployment begins. 
Operations and support is the final phase of acquisitions and consists of two parts: 
life-cycle sustainment and disposal. Life-cycle sustainment ensures that adequate funding 
is programmed to provide training, support, maintenance capability, tools, equipment, 
etc. over the expected life of the product. The program manager (PM) is responsible for 
monitoring the program throughout its life cycle, looking for ways to save money, 
correcting trends away from program baselines, and being prepared to analyze requested 
upgrades to the program as technology and/or threats change. 
Finally, the PM must ensure that there is a plan and matching funding so that at 
the end of its service life, the “system will be demilitarized and disposed of in accordance 
with all legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to safety (including 
explosives safety), security, and the environment” (Kendall, 2013, p. 29). 
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C. EXFOB CHARTER 
Lieutenant General Richard Mills, who is USMC deputy commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration (DC CD&I), formalized the ExFOB on March 28, 2012, 
with the ExFOB Charter. However, the CMC created the ExFOB concept in late 2009, 
and the first ExFOB was established in Quantico, Virginia, in early 2010. The second 
ExFOB was established in Twentynine Palms, California, in late 2010. The concept of 
the ExFOB was to facilitate a convention where industry could demonstrate its 
technologies to reduce the USMC’s reliance on fuel and water (USMC HQ, 2012). The 
ExFOB’s mission is stated as follows: 
The ExFOB Executive Integrated Planning Team (EIPT) will conduct a 
semi-annual field demonstration to identify, evaluate, and accelerate 
material solutions to fulfill identified capability gaps and increase energy 
efficiency as established in the reference [United States Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan]. (USMC HQ, 
2012, p. 2) 
Since the demonstration is semiannual, it is held at Quantico and Twentynine 
Palms each year. This allows demonstrations in different environments and under a range 
of conditions. This section draws heavily from the ExFOB Charter (USMC HQ, 2012). 
1. ExFOB Concept of Operations 
The ExFOB EIPT is in charge of all ExFOB activities and provides the final 
approval on which technologies to test and evaluate. As mentioned previously, industry 
demonstrates its technologies to the ExFOB team in order to meet USMC expeditionary 
energy, water, and waste requirements. The EIPT focuses on up to two capability gaps in 
each ExFOB, as identified in the USMC Expeditionary Energy, Water, and Waste ICD 
(USMC HQ, 2012). As seen in Figure 4, the USMC E2O conducts the day-to-day 
operations by coordinating, managing, and funding the subsequent test and evaluation of 
potential technologies, as depicted in USMC HQ (2012).  
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Figure 10.  ExFOB Process (from USMC HQ, n.d.-a) 
a. Demonstration 
The demonstration phase involves the aforementioned semiannual 
demonstrations. Prior to each of these demonstrations, the ExFOB team sends out a 
request for information to industry regarding specific capability gaps. Industry replies 
with solutions, which the ExFOB team thoroughly reviews. The ExFOB team invites 
some companies to the ExFOB demonstration for a week in order to demonstrate their 
products (USMC HQ, n.d.-a). An ExFOB technical team captures performance 
information as well as feedback from Marines during the demonstration. A report is 
drafted with the results. 
b. Technology Demonstration and Engineering Evaluation 
The ExFOB team uses the report to decide which systems should be further 
evaluated. A small number of systems are then purchased for technology demonstration 
and engineering evaluation in a controlled environment (USMC HQ, n.d.-a). The 
evaluation team has manufacturers make modifications as needed in order to meet USMC 
requirements.  
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c. Field Evaluation 
Systems that pass the technology demonstration are then sent for extended 
evaluation in the field. The field evaluation is where the systems really get tested. Field 
evaluations are done in both training and combat environments. This is conducted mostly 
stateside but is also performed overseas. 
d. Requirements Development 
Feedback from the field is provided to manufacturers so that they can then make 
any necessary modifications. The main output from the evaluation, however, is the 
development of a written military requirement (USMC HQ, n.d.-a). 
e. Acquisition 
Acquisition of the system follows the formal requirement process (JCIDS), which 
also includes PPBE and DAS. The USMC then acquires the capability in order to meet a 
capability gap identified in the USMC Expeditionary Energy, Water, and Waste ICD 
(USMC HQ, 2012). 
2. ExFOB Stakeholders 
The ExFOB brings together stakeholders from the services, industry, and 
academia. The ExFOB Charter delineates specific tasks for many of the stakeholders in 
order to make the ExFOB effective. First and foremost, the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL) chairs the EIPT. The MCWL has a number of tasks and oversees 
the ExFOB process because their mission, in general, is to test and evaluate USMC 
concepts in order to validate, modify, or reject them. The DC CD&I is also a key 
stakeholder with many tasks to perform. One of these tasks is to coordinate with other 
stakeholders such as the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Training and Education 
Command regarding solutions implementation, which occurs when technologies advance 
through the ExFOB process. The ExFOB Charter also requests support from a number of 
stakeholders such as Marine Corps Systems Command, ONR, the USMC E2O, and legal. 
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All of these stakeholders are participants in the preparation and execution of the ExFOB. 
ONR has the additional duty to engage with other research components, industry, and 
academia every few years to offer challenges specific to expeditionary energy, water, and 
waste capability gaps (USMC HQ, 2012). The USMC E2O has the biggest role in 
coordinating and overseeing all ExFOB activities. The E2O is essentially the operations 
department for the ExFOB and day-to-day operations in taking new capabilities “from 
concept to combat” (USMC HQ, n.d.-b).  
3. ExFOB Today 
In the past six years, the ExFOB has made great strides with quick materiel 
solutions. As the program matured, the ExFOB team has been able to do more and more. 
To date, the ExFOB team has assessed nearly 300 technologies and evaluated over 100 
technologies (USMC HQ, n.d.-b). It has also procured and deployed 11 systems to 
Afghanistan, of which four are now USMC programs of record (PORs; USMC HQ, n.d.-
b). The fiscal year (FY) 2013 budget was about $2.4 million and is expected to increase 
in the future, with many capability gaps still to be solved. 
D. ARMY RAPID ACQUISITION 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan underlined the need for rapid acquisition of 
materiel solutions. The traditional acquisition system, the DAS, was too slow in 
responding to emergent requirements on the battlefield. The battlefields in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were very dynamic, and the enemy was quick to adapt, so the threat was 
constantly changing. General Petraeus, then commander of U.S. Central Command, 
stated, “Never, never underestimate how important speed is. We need what we need now. 
As a threat emerges, we need to counter it rapidly” (Petraeus, 2010, p. 5). As a result, all 
services responded by creating rapid acquisition organizations. The REF is one option for 
Army rapid acquisition. 
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1. REF 
The U.S. Army established the REF in late 2002 in order to help solve the rapid 
acquisition problem. The mission of the REF is as follows: 
The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) harnesses current and emerging 
technologies to provide rapid solutions to the urgently required 
capabilities of US Army forces employed globally. (U.S. Army Rapid 
Equipping Force [REF], n.d.) 
The REF uses current and emerging technologies in the form of government off-
the-shelf or GOTS. Similar to the ExFOB, the REF canvasses the government, industry, 
academia, and science communities for existing and emerging technologies (U.S. Army 
Headquarters [HQ], 2009).  
Rapid acquisition of materiel solutions is concerned with equipping as opposed to 
fielding. Fielding uses the DOTMLPF approach in order to find a force-wide solution: the 
traditional DAS, which is a very deliberate, timely, and regulated process. Equipping, on 
the other hand, is focused on operational needs, so it is a quick, short-term solution. The 
REF standard for materiel solutions is an “acceptable” (51% solution) performance 
criterion, which is drastically different from the high standards demanded in traditional 
acquisition (U.S. Army, 2010). 
2. REF Process 
The REF process is very similar to the ExFOB process discussed previously and 
consists of four phases—requirements, materiel solution, deployment, and transition—as 
shown in Figure 11. Figure 11 also shows (with starred points) the four key decisions 
made by the REF director: requirement and director intent approval, cost/schedule/ 
performance approval, equip decision, and disposition decision.  
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Figure 11.  REF Process (from Baldauf & Reherman, 2011, p. 40) 
a. Requirements 
Similar to the JCIDS, the REF’s requirements phase includes identifying, 
assessing, and prioritizing capabilities needed to complete the mission. This phase begins 
by receiving requirements from a number of sources. The REF team then analyzes the 
received requirements to provide recommendations to the REF director. The director then 
decides which requirements to pursue and if any requirements need to be refined.  
b. Materiel Solution 
The materiel solution phase begins with identifying a solution. The REF team 
formally and informally conducts market research with industry, academia, and 
government. This research results in an acquisition strategy and the director’s decision on 
how to proceed. The process continues with contracting, purchasing, and production. The 
final step is testing and the director’s decision to move to the deployment phase. 
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c. Deployment 
The deployment phase is used to evaluate the system in a training and operational 
environment. The system is shipped and delivered to the unit whether it is stateside or 
overseas. The REF team ensures that the units are trained, and the assessment begins 
immediately. The final step is for the REF director to review all of the assessment data 
and decide whether to move to the transition phase, terminate, or continue for a limited 
period. 
d. Transition 
The REF director’s decision is sent to the Army Research, Development, and 
Engineering Command for another disposition decision. This disposition decision goes to 
the Army Capabilities Integration Center for a final disposition decision before 
proceeding through the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process. 
The CDRT process establishes the capability for life-cycle sustainment. 
3. REF Timeline 
The REF’s scope has made it very successful in providing materiel solutions in a 
timely manner. Since its inception, the REF has introduced many types of equipment to 
meet urgent warfighter needs. Because the REF targets existing and emerging 
technologies, the solution timelines are very short, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  REF Timeline (from U.S. Army HQ, n.d.) 
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The timeline is largely driven by the complexity of the solution as well as the 
existing technology. If the technology exists, it takes 90 days on average to deliver a 
solution. If the technology has to be modified, it takes 180 days on average. Finally, if the 
technology is emerging or has to be developed, it takes 365 days on average. As of 2007, 
the average time for all technologies to go from request to initial operating capability was 
128 days (Chyma, 2010). 
4. REF Energy to the Edge Program 
In FY2011, the REF started the Energy to the Edge program in response to 
expeditionary energy and water requirements. The program’s goals are to meet combat 
units’ expeditionary needs more efficiently and thereby reduce fossil fuel consumption 
and reliance on logistical resupply (“Taking Alternative Energy,” 2013). The REF meets 
these goals by working with a number of partners to identify and evaluate alternate 
energy systems. Generally, the REF team takes a “hybrid approach,” which is a mix of 
energy sources and technologies (“Taking Alternative Energy,” 2013). In early 2012, the 
REF deployed a variety of systems to Afghanistan that either reduced or removed the 
requirement for fuel. These systems have had great results and will continue to be 
improved with feedback from the field and new technologies. The REF continues to 
make great strides in meeting the Army’s strategic energy goals (“Taking Alternative 
Energy,” 2013). 
E. USMC RAPID ACQUISITION 
The USMC does not have a dedicated rapid acquisition command. Instead, critical 
capability gaps are identified for correction by warfighter-submitted requests called urgent 
universal needs statements (UUNSs). The USMC has established the UUNS “as the single 
means to identify acute deficiencies in operational capability” (Flynn, 2008, p. 2).  
The UUNS is an exceptional request from a combatant command–level Marine 
component commander for an additional warfighting capability critically needed by 
operating forces conducting combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver the 
capability requested by the U-UNS is likely to result in the inability of units to 
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accomplish their missions or to risk increased probability of casualties and loss of life 
(Magnus, 2008, Enclosure 7, p. 1).  
UUNSs, which have been identified by units “supporting, conducting, or awaiting 
imminent combat or specific contingency deployments” (Flynn, 2008, p. 3) are used to 
drive the urgent needs process (UNP).  
The UNP is led by the DC CD&I, with the goal of rapidly fielding a solution to 
the capability gap identified in the UUNS (Flynn, 2008, p. 2). The Secretary of the Navy 
goal for the UNP is for the solution development team to provide a recommendation 
within 60 days of receipt of the UUNS and to provide the “best available solutions to 
mission-critical capability gaps … in less than 24 months” (Branch, 2012, p. 1-29). In 
order to meet this aggressive timeline, the UNP is designed to trade increased acquisition 
speed for additional risk incurred in terms of sustainment, maintenance, training, and 
other long-term considerations. 
Once the validated UUNS has entered the UNP, the request is entered into the 
Virtual UUNS (VUUNS) system, an online collaboration tool that enables concurrent 
action from all of the involved stakeholders, rapid staffing, continuous oversight by senior 
leadership and a greatly reduced response time to provide the required capability (Flynn, 
2008, pp. 2–3). Through the use of the VUUNS system, the DC CD&I gathers input from 
the stakeholders, ensures that the solution to the capability gap is not being addressed by 
other services’ urgent needs programs (e.g., Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement, 
Urgent Operational Needs Statement), formulates a recommended course of action (COA), 
and then presents this COA to the Marine Requirements Oversight Counsel (MROC). The 
MROC then evaluates the COA and (assuming a positive decision) allocates resources to 
fund the capability for rapid deployment (Flynn, 2008, p. 3). 
The final portion of the UNP is to transition the completed/fielded UUNS into an 
UNS. Transitioning the newly fielded technology into the deliberate acquisition cycle 
provides a thorough review of the capability and provides decision makers with the 
opportunity to evaluate it for further refinement, development and integration into the 
USMC as a POR. 
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The goal of this project is to conduct a comparative analysis of the ExFOB 
process with other acquisition processes, to measure the effectiveness of the ExFOB 
process and products toward reducing energy use, and to evaluate the value added to the 
Marine Corps. In order to assess the ExFOB’s contribution toward a 50 percent reduction 
in Marine Corps expeditionary energy consumption, this project answers the following 
three questions: 
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the ExFOB 
program within different acquisition processes? 
2. What are the contributions of the ExFOB programs and process? 
3. Is the ExFOB value added to the USMC?  
The analysis of the ExFOB is performed in three phases. The first phase seeks to 
answer the research question: What are the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the 
ExFOB program within different acquisition processes? Here, the ExFOB is analyzed 
from a “big picture” perspective as a process and how it functions within the acquisition 
process as a whole. Although the ExFOB is not an acquisition process in and of itself, in 
this phase it is analyzed within the acquisition process it utilizes. The ExFOB within the 
acquisition process is compared to other DOD acquisition processes such as rapid, REF, 
and traditional. All of the acquisition processes consist of three fundamental elements: 
requirements, resourcing, and acquisition (Chyma, 2010). The analysis looks broadly at 
these elements across the various acquisition processes to determine advantages and 
disadvantages of each.  
The second phase is an analysis of the ExFOB energy programs to answer the 
research question: What are the contributions of the ExFOB programs and process? The 
ExFOB was involved in four programs which are now USMC PORs. The analysis 
comprises the following elements: 
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1. Description 
 Requirement generation (if applicable) 
 Cost 
 R&D and O&M funds spent during evaluation 
2. Timeline 
 Participation in initial ExFOB 
 Dates dates/milestones through the ExFOB process 
 Transition to USMC POR 
3. Capability  
 Performance of the system 
 Incremental benefits over previous systems 
4. Measure of Performance—Gallons Per Marine Per Day 
 Establish consumption baseline assumption 
 Analyze contribution of individual technology toward reducing fuel use 
The third phase is value-added analysis. This phase serves to answer the research 
question: Is the ExFOB value added to the USMC? The analysis is founded in 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) theory by Thomas Housel and Arthur Bell (Housel & 
Bell, 2001). KVA theory is used to formulate value centers or areas to be analyzed. The 
premise of the theory is that “processes within an organization should add value to the 
final product, and that variations in these processes are transformational and can be 
valued in the final product” (Middleton, 2006). The analysis uses value centers developed 
in the Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell by Middleton (2006). The value centers are predicated on a baseline that 
is established using data from Phase One, Phase Two, and the background section of our 
report. The baseline serves to show the processes before the ExFOB as well as existing 
processes. The following value centers are used (Middleton, 2006): 
1. Speed  
2. Budgetary Options  
3. Streamlined Bureaucracy 
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4. Focus 
5. Wider Portfolio Balance 
6. Alignment with Acquisition Strategy 
7. Impartiality 
8. Life-cycle Costs 
9. Feedback 















The analysis of the ExFOB is performed in three phases. Phase one is a 
comparative process analysis to answer the research question: What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of utilizing the ExFOB program within different acquisition 
processes? Phase two is a contribution analysis to answer the research question: What are 
the contributions of the ExFOB programs and process? Finally, phase three is a value 
analysis to answer the research question: Is the ExFOB value added to the USMC? The 
answers to these questions enable an assessment of the ExFOB’s contribution toward a 
50 percent reduction in Marine Corps expeditionary energy consumption. 
A. PHASE ONE: PROCESS ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the ExFOB begins with understanding its purpose. As detailed in the 
background section, the USMC determined energy requirements and created the E2O 
office and the ExFOB to fulfill those requirements. The ExFOB is important to meeting 
these energy requirements because the CMC established a timeline in which to meet 
them. This analysis compares the ExFOB’s role within an acquisition process in meeting 
the USMC requirements.  
All acquisition processes, whether traditional or rapid, consist of three 
fundamental elements: requirements, resourcing, and acquisition (Chyma, 2010). The 
first part of the analysis examines how the ExFOB fits into DOD acquisition as a whole 
and specifically each of these fundamental elements. The analysis compares the ExFOB 
(within traditional acquisition) to USMC rapid acquisition (UUNS), traditional 
acquisition (without the ExFOB), and the REF within each of the three components. 
Facts and assumptions for this analysis are as follows: 
 Scope is limited to COTS or non-developmental item (NDI) acquisition of 
existing or emerging technologies 
 Data sets vary in size, and some are small 
 Estimations are used when data are not available 
 42
1. Requirements Comparison 
Regardless of the acquisition process, all of the processes have a requirements 
component. The various processes have different names for this component, but in 
general, the result is the same—a requirement is determined. The primary difference is in 
the process itself. As described in the various background sections, some of these 
processes are very involved and lengthy, while others are very streamlined and short. The 
processes in this component have varying time durations. In the following analysis, the 
various types of acquisition are examined side by side to better understand the differences 
and benefits within the processes.  
a. Traditional Acquisition 
Traditional acquisition is time-constrained by its deliberate process. The USMC 
has a set calendar schedule to align with the PPBE process because it reviews all USMC 
requirements during this deliberate review and validation process. Time duration for 
requirements determination is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Traditional Acquisition Time Duration for Requirements 
Determination 








USMC and JCIDS process (Estimated 5-6 years*)
Initial generation and validation
CBA (Estimated 3-6 months)
*Total estimated time considers breaks between processes.
ICD JROC (2.5 months)
ICD USMC (October even yr - August odd year: 11 months)
Subsequent reviews and validations
CDD USMC (October even yr - August odd year: 11 months)
CDD JROC (2.5 months)
CPD USMC (October even yr - August odd year: 11 months)
CPD JROC (2.5 months)
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b. USMC Rapid Acquisition—UUNS 
USMC rapid acquisition uses UUNS, which is timely as it has truncated 
requirements generation and validation processes compared to traditional acquisition. A 
summary of time duration appears in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   UUNS Time Duration for Requirements Determination 
c. REF 
Similar to UUNS, the REF uses timely requirements generation and validation 
processes. The requirements are generated through the 10-line capability gap statement, 
which has all the same elements as a standard urgent operational need (UON) or UUNS. 
The validation process is expedited because the REF director analyzes and prioritizes 
requirements and then decides which requirements to fulfill and move to the materiel 
solution phase. The time duration is summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.   REF Time Duration for Requirements Determination 
d. ExFOB 
Initial requirements determination was completed prior to the ExFOB using the 
traditional acquisition process—JCIDS. As noted in the background section, a CBA was 
Median Time in Days
103*
90*
*Small sample size of 16 UUNS from (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics 













*REF data is included in all Army UONS data and the data is skewed smaller because equipment transfers 
were included (USD [AT&L], 2009, Figure 3).
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conducted and an ICD was produced. The primary difference is that this process does not 
go through the entire JCIDS process. From the ICD, the ExFOB does its work, which will 
be covered in the acquisition section, to solve the requirements gaps and a materiel 
solution. The solution is then re-inserted into the JCIDS process for review and validation 
(CPD) to get resourcing (PPBE). For the purposes of this analysis, the CBA and ICD 
time durations were exempted from the ExFOB timeline because it was a one-time event 
for all off the ExFOBs and completed years ago. The time duration is summarized in 
Table 5.   
 
Table 5.   Time Duration of ExFOB In Conjunction With (ICW) an 
Acquisition Process for Requirements Determination 
e. Summary 
Requirements determination using the JCIDS process is very lengthy as easily 
seen in Figure 15. The advantage of the ExFOB is the ICD was developed and it can 
continue to determine materiel solutions. However, the requirements process is dynamic, 
and technology changes rapidly. In general, requirements review and validation is an 
annual event for the USMC. From the ExFOB, the materiel solution re-enters the JCIDS 
process. 
Requirements determination using rapid acquisition is short duration. The USMC 
process using UUNS or the REF both have very short generation and validation times. 








ExFOB ICW truncated JCIDS process (4 years)
Initial generation and validation
Requirement generation 
Requirement validation
*Data not available for UUNS in conjunction with ExFOB but it is estimated to be analogous to other UUNS 
data from (USD [AT&L], 2009).
Subsequent reviews and validations
CDD USMC (October even yr - August odd year: 11 months)
CDD JROC (2.5 months)
CPD USMC (October even yr - August odd year: 11 months)
CPD JROC (2.5 months)
ExFOB ICW UUNS
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For war time needs, this is very important, but it is also important in cases where a 
capability is needed faster than the traditional acquisition process. The ExFOB in 
conjunction with UUNS and REF energy initiatives are both good examples of how 
quickly requirements can be determined. From the ExFOB, the materiel solution goes 
straight to acquisition using an UUNS. The requirements comparison is depicted in 
Figure 13. 
  
Figure 13.  Requirements Generation and Validation Comparison  
in Median Days 
2. Resourcing Comparison 
Regardless of the acquisition process, all of the acquisition processes have a 
resourcing component. The various processes have different methods and sources of 
funding, which can be limiting. Since Congress controls the purse strings, there are only 
certain pots of money authorized for resourcing. This component is also deliberate in 
certain acquisition processes, which means that it can be time-consuming as well. 
Conversely, resourcing can be very fast under other processes. Therefore, side-by-side 
CPD
ICD only, (3x) for CDD and CPD 
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analysis of the resourcing time duration involved in various types of acquisition helps to 
better understand the differences as well as costs and benefits. This analysis specifically 
examines the time duration involved to obtain funds in order to field a capability. 
a. Traditional Acquisition 
As seen in the requirements section, this process is deliberate so it aligns with the 
PPBE process, which is also deliberate. The POM is submitted in the even years, which is 
why the requirements are reviewed and validated in the odd years. Time duration is 
summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.   Traditional Acquisition Time Duration for Resourcing 
b. USMC Rapid Acquisition—UUNS 
UUNS resourcing occurs quickly because it uses funds by exception. The most 
common method is congressional supplemental appropriations and recently overseas 
contingency operation (OCO) funds. The second method is to reprogram funds of 
approved programs. Reprogramming funds can be done at the USMC level as long as the 
dollar amount is under a certain limit. If it is over the limit, then it needs congressional 
approval, which takes more time. The time duration is summarized in Table 7. 
 





USMC and PPBE Process
JCIDS: Need identified and approved
Requirement approval to program initiation
Total time until funding to initiate program




OCO (Estimated 15-30 days)
UUNS 
Congressional supplemental appropriation (Estimated 3-6 months)
Reprogramming funds from approved programs (0-3 months)
 47
c. REF 
The REF is similar to UUNS in resourcing but also has additional means. It uses 
reprogrammed funding and supplemental appropriations for funding. However, the 
primary source of funding for the REF is a baseline budget, which it uses for anticipated 
needs. Time duration is summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8.   REF Time Duration for Resourcing 
d. ExFOB 
Similar to the REF, the ExFOB has a baseline budget which is programmed 
(PPBE). The budget consists of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) money. Although the baseline budget is 
programmed and readily available, the ExFOB does not use it to field items. Funding for 
fielding comes from two different sources and is handled by Marine Corps Systems 
Command (MCSC). When an item is programmed, it uses the traditional process and 
takes two years to receive funding. The ExFOB can also respond to an UUNS in which 
case the respective funding is available. Time duration is summarized in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   Time Duration of ExFOB ICW an Acquisition Process for 
Resourcing 





Baseline budget (Estimated a few days for approval)
Congressional supplemental appropriation (Estimated 3-6 months)
Reprogramming funds from approved programs (0-3 months)




ExFOB ICW an acquisition process
Baseline budget is for RDT&E only and available
ICW PPBE (Estimated 2 years)
ICW UUNS (Estimated 14-120 days)
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e. Summary 
Resourcing is distinctly different across the various acquisition processes. The 
ExFOB is resourced only for RDT&E, and a materiel solution must be programmed using 
PPBE to be procured. The PPBE can be lengthy depending on when it enters the POM 
cycle. 
The rapid acquisition resourcing is much shorter regardless of the funding source. 
Since funds are essentially available for acquisition, the materiel solution is procured 
once the ExFOB is complete. The advantage of the REF is it is authorized to procure and 
is resourced accordingly. The resourcing for fielding comparison is depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Resourcing Comparison of Acquisition Processes 
3. Acquisition Comparison 
Regardless of the acquisition process, all of the processes have an acquisition 
component. The primary difference is in the process itself. As described in the various 
background sections, some of these processes are very involved and lengthy while others 
are streamlined and short. In the following analysis, the various types of acquisition are 
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examined side-by-side to better understand the differences as well as costs and benefits in 
the processes. The analysis specifically focuses on the time duration involved to have an 
initial operating capability (IOC) after the requirement is validated and resourced.  
a. Traditional Acquisition 
Acquisition does not take place until funding is available. As mentioned 
previously in the resourcing section, it takes two to four years for approval and funding. 
The funding starts the development phase, which is minimal because the acquisition is for 
NDI or modified COTS. Items are purchased for initial fielding and test and evaluation. 
Based on the tests, items are modified if needed until it meets USMC’s requirements. 
Then items are purchased for deployment. See summary of time duration in Table 10. 
 
Table 10.   Traditional Acquisition Time Duration for Procurement 
b. USMC Rapid Acquisition—UUNS 
UUNS is very fast in acquiring capabilities for warfighters. This process is not 
hindered by funding and has a streamlined approval and validation process. Summary of 
the time duration is given in Table 11. 
 
Table 11.   UUNS Time Duration for Procurement 






Total (From RDT&E to IOC)
Initial fielding or IOC (Estimated 3-12 months)
Full rate production of full operational capability (Estimated 3-12 months)
RDT&E
Median Time in Days
142
UUNS
From RDT&E to IOC
 Note: Data from (USD [AT&L], 2009).
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c. REF 
The REF is similarly very fast in acquiring capabilities. Besides not being 
hindered by funding and the approval and validation processes, the REF equips rather 
than fields. Equipping means the capability can be acquired at a lower standard, which is 
often faster. Summary of the time duration appears in Table 12. 
 
Table 12.   REF Time Duration for Procurement 
d. ExFOB 
The ExFOB by design was established to test and evaluate COTS energy items. 
Through the ExFOB process, operational testing is streamlined, and modifications are 
made along the way in order to meet USMC requirements. The acquisition path follows 
the respective resourcing path and is handled by MCSC. If the item is programmed, it 
uses the traditional process and enters DAS. If it uses UUNS, funding is readily available, 
and acquisition starts quickly. Time duration is summarized in Table 13. 
 
Table 13.   Time Duration of ExFOB ICW an Acquisition Process for 
Procurement 





From RDT&E to IOC
Advertised 90-180 days (Figure 6)
Expeditionary energy materiel solutions only
**Data from (W. Garland, personal communication, January 29, 2014).
*REF data is included in all Army UONS and the data is skewed smaller because equipment transfers were 
included (USD [AT&L], 2009, Figure 3).







ICW DAS (Estimated 1-2 years)
ICW UUNS (From RDT&E to IOC)
Total time duration ExFOB ICW DAS
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e. Summary 
The ExFOB has a streamlined RDT&E process. Compared to traditional 
acquisition, it is estimated to be much faster on average. Regardless of using the 
traditional or rapid acquisition process, the ExFOB’s role is the same. The time duration 
to field a product or achieve IOC under the different acquisition processes is significant. 
The ExFOB in conjunction with UUNS is very similar to REF energy in time 
duration. REF is typically much faster in equipping on average, but the energy products 
seemed to be more deliberate. The UUNS process on average is also much faster and 
highlights the difference between the ExFOB’s deliberate RDT&E and wartime needs. 
The acquisition comparison is depicted in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Acquisition Comparison to Reach IOC 
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4. Comparing the Whole 
The individual components above highlight some of the key differences between 
the various acquisition systems. To better illustrate the differences of the processes, 
Figure 16 compares all processes and components together.  
 
Figure 16.  Comparison of Acquisition Processes from Identified Need to Initial 
Fielding or IOC (after Chyma, 2010, p. 13) 
The ExFOB’s benefit in the acquisition of USMC energy requirements can be 
easily seen in Figure 18. The ExFOB accelerates the R&D process and injects the COTS 
item identified for acquisition into the USMC traditional acquisition process. By doing 
this, nearly two to three years are eliminated from the traditional process. Again, the 
traditional process can take about five to six years from the time a need is identified until 
a materiel solution is fielded (Chyma, 2010). This deliberate process makes sense since 












* Data from (W. Garland, personal communication, January 29, 2014).
** Data from (USD [AT&L], 2009, Figure 3).
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acquisition process, which is needed because there are many capability gaps to fill by the 
2025 deadline.  
The ExFOB process in conjunction with traditional acquisition does not come 
close to the UUNS or the REF processes in terms of time duration with median days of 
335 and 218, respectively. Only considering the REF energy projects, it is still only  
377 median days. The ExFOB process, from the start of an ExFOB to the fielding of a 
capability, can take two to three years. Another difference between the two is the ExFOB 
is a semiannual event and the REF is not on a deliberate schedule. The distinct 
differences are attributed to the REF being a rapid acquisition organization and the 
ExFOB not being one and therefore having to work within the traditional acquisition 
process. The UUNS follows a rapid acquisition process as well and is used occasionally 
for USMC energy requirements. The ExFOB’s role using the UUNS process appears to 
be the same as using the traditional process in that it determines the materiel solution for 
MCSC. MCSC can then rapidly acquire the identified materiel solution using UUNS 
resourcing. The four PORs were acquired using UUNS vice traditional acquisition and 
the time duration was 360 median days. The ExFOB time duration does not include 
requirements generation time but does add 90 days for validation. This process is nearly 
the same time duration as the REF energy initiatives at 377 days. 
5. ExFOB Versus REF Case Study: 3kW Hybrid Systems 
Solar Stik, a St. Augustine, FL, company, manufactures a power system that is 
comprised of rigid solar panels or a wind turbine, the Wind Stik, and also a combination 
generation set of solar panel and wind turbine generation. This system is portable and can 
be quickly set up in proximity to power users. The Solar Stik system is able to supply 
power to a variety of applications including lights, computers, and cooling. Solar Stik 
manages the power generated by its system via the Power Paks power management and 
storage equipment. The systems come in multiple configurations that can store 500 or 
1000-watt-hours of power. The units manage and monitor the solar charge, batteries, 
power outputs, both AC and DC, and system circuitry (Kauchak, 2011).  
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Both the U.S. Army and the USMC have a need for systems that can provide 3kW 
of power, and both sought out a hybrid system that would be suitable for their use. 
Recently, both organizations evaluated a hybrid system produced in part by Solar Stik. 
The unit is composed of a solar panel set mounted either to a trailer or on a stand, 
combined with a generator. It is unclear from reports furnished if both the REF and the 
ExFOB used the exact equipment combinations, but for this analysis, the requirement for 
3kW of hybrid power was identical. According to the manufacturer, the Solar Stik hybrid 
system will manage power generated from its solar panels and store excess energy in a 
battery bank. When the solar energy generation does not meet the power needs and the 
batteries are running low, the generator will start and charge the batteries. This 
configuration can produce two-thirds fuel savings over the traditional power supply 
(Canaday, 2012). Solar Stik systems allow power to be stored and instantly available to 
the power application versus a traditional generator system that is constantly generating 
power at peak power levels and meeting the instant power demands of the system. The 
traditional system creates a large amount of unused and non-stored power. A 2011 
USMC study at PB Boldak found that a hybrid power system could reduce generator 
runtime by 80 percent and decrease fuel consumption by 55 percent. These tests were 
carried out on a 10kW system, but results for lower power demands will be similar and 
the USMC reported that at loads below 6kW the hybrid system would be very effective 
(USMC E2O, 2013). The USMC results are further backed up by the Army REF’s 
Village Stability Platform Lam, an isolated base on a mountainside near Kandahar, 
Afghanistan. The REF made measurements before and after adapting its facility to a 
hybrid system for Lam. The hybrid initiative reduced the number of generators required 
for their outpost from five to three. By reducing the number of operating generators, the 
outpost decreased their daily fuel consumption by 120 gal/day, as well as reducing the 
base’s logistical needs. The hybrid system allows the base to go further without resupply, 
thus increasing its warfighting capability (W. Garland, personal communication, January 
29, 2014).  
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a. REF Solar Stik 380/400 
The REF 3kW hybrid energy system used the Solar Stik technology, as well as 
some portion of their system being supplied by Alion Science of Mt. Arlington, New 
Jersey. The Army’s objective was to reduce fuel consumption while storing excess 
energy generated. The 3kW hybrid system would save up to 50 percent usage and 
decrease required maintenance on existing generators (W. Garland, personal 
communication, January 29, 2014). The REF evaluated the Solar Stik 380/400 (see 
Figure 17) in September 2012; by April 2013, the REF had purchased 18 units and sent 
them out for use at a cost of $1.46 million. The systems were sent to units supporting 
OEF, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Africa Command (W. Garland, personal 
communication, January 29, 2014). 
 
Figure 17.  Solar Stik (from W. Garland, personal communication,  
January 29, 2014) 
b. ExFOB 3kW Hybrid System 
At ExFOB 2013, the USMC demonstrated two 3kW hybrid systems. The Solar 
Stik MIL Series 3kW trailer with the Earl Energy 3kW FlexGen system (see Figure 18). 
The Solar Stik showed at reduction of 50 percent fuel and 56 percent runtime over the 
standard 3kW Tactical Quiet Generator (TQG). The Earl Energy 3kW FlexGen system 
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reduced fuel consumption by 52 percetn and runtime by 66 percnt. The systems met with 
initial USMC approval, and subsequent agreements for follow-up were made. The USMC 
will be performing further evaluation of the system at NSWC Carderock during 2014. 
The cost to the ExFOB budget for the demonstration was $265,000 in RDT&E  
(K. Hanson, personal communication, December 16, 2013).  
 
Figure 18.  USMC Solar Stik MIL Series 3kW Trailer and  
Earl Energy 3kW FlexGen (from K. Hanson,  
personal communication, December 16, 2013) 
c. Analysis  
The 3kW hybrid system is the best example of an identical system moving 
through both the REF and the ExFOB processes. The nature of the two organizations 
becomes clear through their spending data. The REF seeks to provide answers in the 
short term to meet the needs of Army units now; a quick field check of a product to 
ensure it will meet minimum requirements is all that is required to get it to the field. 
Follow-on procurement may be an option for the Army if the system proves capable and 
useful, but the REF excels at quick solutions. The USMC uses the ExFOB to evaluate 
materiel solutions and contribute to achieving the USMC fuel savings objectives. The 
ExFOB takes a long view approach to energy solutions and is not interested in immediate 
needs of the USMC. ExFOB can patiently determine which material solutions are in the 
best interest of the USMC to meet the USMC Commandant’s objectives.  
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B. PHASE TWO: CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS  
The ExFOB program’s contribution toward reducing expeditionary energy use is 
analyzed in terms of time saved through an accelerated acquisition process and the fuel-
savings generated by the individual technologies recommended for procurement.   
1. GREENS 
Although the Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System 
(GREENS) (see Figure 19) program started as an answer to the relatively small-scale 
problem of providing power for a remote camera system, the requirements developed by 
the ExFOB evolved it into a more capable system. GREENS Gen 1 has the capacity to 
provide 300W, 24V continuous power (1000W peak) without the use of any fuel, and the 
Gen 2 is able to provide a maximum of 5000W and take advantage of a broader spectrum 
of sunlight (UEC Electronics, n.d.). This capability has enabled the Marines to reduce the 
fuel consumed to generate electricity at forward operating bases. These fuel savings can 
be translated into a reduced requirement for the number and size of supply convoys 
(which, in turn, reduces casualties suffered from ambushes and IEDs against those 
vulnerable convoys), or into increased operational capability with the same quantity of 
fuel delivered to the forward location in the form of additional fuel for combat/utility 




Figure 19.  GREENS Units (from Marine Corps Systems  
Command [MCSC], 2011) 
a. Timeline 
The timeline outlined below demonstrates the aggressive schedule the ExFOB 
maintained once they had access to the technology. 
 
 2008—Forward-deployed Marines identified a critical requirement and 
submit a UONS to power a rooftop-mounted Ground-Based Operational 
Surveillance System (G-BOSS) without using a generator (the ground-
level generator was loud, decreasing the situational awareness of the 
Marines, and was also prone to tampering/pilfering by the local 
population).  
 July 2009–March 2010—The request was forwarded to Naval Surface 
Warfare Center (NSWC) Carderock, to develop a solution using COTS 
equipment and conduct limited test and evaluation (K. Hanson, personal 
communication, December 16, 2013).  
 March 2010—Prototype GREENS sent to the first ExFOB (2010-1) for 
evaluation against commercially available options.  
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 May–June 2010—Prototype GREENS participate in Exercise African 
Lion as part of an early-stage field evaluation. 
 October 2010—Seven units are produced by NSWC Carderock and 
deployed with India 3rd Battalion/5th Regiment to Afghanistan for further 
field evaluation. 
 March 2011—Statement of need issued (USMC E2O, 2013).  
 April 2011—UEC Electronics awarded an $11 million production contract 
for 270 GREENS systems (UEC Electronics, 2012). 
 July 2012—UEC Electronics awarded a $40 million production contract 
for 1,000 additional GREENS systems (UEC Electronics, 2012). 
b. Measure of Performance 
The acquisition of the GREENS is evaluated in terms of both the contributions of 
the individual system and the ExFOB process toward reducing expeditionary energy use. 
(1) Contribution of GREENS.  The GREENS system is providing 
considerable reductions in fuel required across the Marine Corps. According to a case 
study performed by UEC, GREENS units are each saving roughly 27 gallons of fuel per 
day, and as a result, their deployment across 100 patrol bases is saving the Marine Corps 
roughly $26 million per year in fuel costs. Assuming one GREENS unit per patrol base, 
we multiplied the number of gallons of fuel saved per day per GREENS by 365 days and 
then multiplied that by the number of deployed GREENS (100 units) to find that those 
GREENS are saving approximately 985,000 gallons of fuel per year (see Equation 1). 




100 GREENS = 985,000 gal of fuel (saved)
year
 (1) 
Working backward from the Marine Corps study finding of saving $26 million 
per year across those same 100 patrol bases, we find a fuel cost of $26.40 per gallon (see 
Equation 2). 
 $26,000,000  year




Initially, the idea of $26.40/gallon seems high for fuel. However, once the costs 
incurred to actually get that fuel from the pump (at roughly $3/gallon) to the FOB are 
included, this is easier to believe. In fact, there are estimates ranging from $200 to $400 
per gallon for a fully burdened cost of fuel delivered in-theater (Tiron, 2009). The 
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estimate of $400 per gallon came of the requirement to use helicopters to deliver fuel to 
some SOF bases, which were inaccessible by road, and serves as a good estimate of what 
it could cost to deliver fuel in other areas where the roads are unreliable, damaged, or 
destroyed. Although the war in Afghanistan is winding down, as the United States’ first 
responders, the Marine Corps will continue to operate ahead of a well-established 
logistics trail in austere and remote environments (i.e., while conducting humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief [HADR] missions in the aftermath of a natural disaster). 
Figure 20 shows how the savings (in dollars) would be affected by the location the fuel is 
delivered to, based on that range of fuel prices and assuming 100 GREENS units in 
operation. This wide range of savings demonstrates the importance of the GREENS 
capability at the most remote locations. 
 



















Assuming current levels of fielding of GREENS (through continued 
expeditionary operations, CONUS-based training missions during home-cycle, HADR 
assistance, or any of the other missions assigned to the USMC), the Marines will continue 
to save $26 million in fuel annually. Compared to the program purchase cost of $51 
million, $500,000 O&M funds, and $350,000 R&D funds, this represents a rapid return 
on investment. 
(2) Contribution of the ExFOB Process.  The biggest savings come from the 
continuing operation of the GREENS systems. What must also be considered when 
looking at the ExFOB program is the additional capability generated by the ExFOB 
process. By taking 11 months off the minimum COTS timeline (which is typically at least 
two years) to procure and deploy the same 100 GREENS units, the ExFOB process saved 
the Marine Corps $23.8 million in fuel costs. 
 $26M savings
year
 11 months saved
12 months per year
 = $23.8M  (3) 
Translated through the Marine’s assumption of $26.40/gallon, this savings equals 
roughly 903,000 gallons of saved fuel. As an added benefit, by removing the need to 
deliver that fuel to the FOBs, the ExFOB has indirectly reduced the danger faced by 
Marines escorting fuel convoys. Here is where we see the true benefit of the ExFOB; the 
process enables them to rapidly evaluate a new capability, match the capability to an 
identified and validated requirement, and field that product. The speed at which this 
process is accomplished benefits both the end users and the Marine Corps as a whole by 
enabling them to do more with the same amount of resources. 
2. SPACES and SPACES II 
The need for a portable solar charging and power device became obvious to the 
USMC shortly after OIF commenced. Through an UUNS the requirement for Solar 
Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES) was created. Troops 
dispersed in rugged terrain far from logistic support and a base of operations needed a 
means to operate their radios and charge batteries for communication devices. Solar 
panels, which are ruggedized and attached to a fold out cover, are the primary means of 
powering the charging system. If adequate solar power is not available, the system has 
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multiple power inputs, including various batteries and fuel cells, or a North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization vehicle adapter. The entire unit weighs 2.6 pounds (not including the 
batteries being charged). It is a plug and play system that required no adjustments; once 
connected SPACES provides 12 to 32 VDC, and up to 320W maximum (there are two 
output connectors that allow 160W each). The system is 96% efficient and can charge a 
standard LiIon battery in three hours. The system’s main use is to charge BB-2590 
tactical batteries, but the power outlet can supply power directly to AN/PRC-148, -152 
and -153 radios (K. Hanson, personal communication, December 16, 2013; Iris 
Technology Corporation, 2010). A SPACES system is available for purchase via the 
General Services Administration (GSA) website for $6,737.51 (General Services 
Administration [GSA], 2014). 
 
Figure 21.  SPACES unit (from K. Hanson, personal communication,  
December 16, 2013) 
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a. Timeline 
 2002—Marine Corps Systems Command Expeditionary Power Systems–
PMM-153 experiments with a portable solar charging system called 
SPACES. 
 April 2004—Requirement signed seeking solar solution that would power 
equipment similar to batteries, without modification. 
 September 2004—PMM-153 recognizes solar may be a solution to power 
supply needs for fielded units. 
 2009—434 SPACES units produced. 
 March 2010—SPACES demonstrated at ExFOB 2010-1 MCB Quantico, 
VA.  
 2010—SPACES initial operational capability, over 1,000 units produced 
by manufacturer Iris Technology Corporation. 
 2011—SPACES II request for information. 
 2012—SPACES II request for proposal. 
 2014—SPACES II initial operational capability. 
 2016—SPACES II full operational capability (K. Hanson, personal 
communication, December 16, 2013; Iris Technology Corporation, 2010; 
Martin, 2004). 
b. Measure of Performance 
The acquisition of the SPACES is evaluated in terms of both the contributions of 
the individual system and the ExFOB process toward reducing expeditionary energy use. 
(1) Contribution of SPACES system.  The SPACES system has provided a 
twofold capability: First, Marines on patrol are not required to carry replacement batteries 
for their equipment (which can save approximately 900 lbs. for a 14-day mission); 
second, the SPACES system serves as a source of supplemental electricity when the 
Marines are in camp between missions (MCSC, 2012).  
The ability to charge their batteries on patrol, while not directly saving fuel, has 
tremendous second-order savings for the Marines in the form of reduced logistics 
support. The Marines have determined that for every gallon of water or fuel delivered to 
the front lines, seven gallons of fuel are used to get it there (Vavrin, 2010). Assuming the 
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averaged weight of the water and diesel fuel is 7.5lbs/gal, this means that every pound of 
supplies requires approximately .93 gal of fuel to deliver it to an FOB. If Marines at each 
of the 100 FOBs in Afghanistan conduct two 14-day patrols each month, Equation 4 
shows that there could be more than two million gallons of fuel saved each year.  






100 FOBs   12 months
year
 2,008,800 gal year (saved)
(4) 
In addition to reducing the pounds of batteries required at FOBs, SPACES are 
having an unintended benefit: Marines are able to use them in camp to power military 
equipment, as well as personal electronics. In spite of being incredibly wasteful, “[t]he 
reality is Marines are turning on a three-to-six kilowatt generator so they can charge their 
iPod” (MCSC, 2012). The Marines’ 3kW generator uses 0.5 gallons per hour (MCSC, 
2011), so even if all the Marines got together to charge their personal gear over the 
course of an hour, more than 18,000 gallons of fuel could be saved each year by not using 




 1 hour use
day
100 FOBs   365 days
year
 18,250 gal year (saved) (5) 
What truly highlights the savings SPACES generate in basecamp is factoring in 
the seven gallons of fuel required just to deliver each gallon of generator fuel, boosting 
the initial gains by a factor of eight for net savings of 146,000 gallons per year and 
pushing the total annual savings to 2,154,800 gallons of fuel per year.  
(2) Contribution of the ExFOB.  The ExFOB’s process enabled the SPACES 
to go from an initial demonstration in March of 2010 to IOC in one year, saving an entire 
year off the usual 24-month COTS purchase timeline. This translates to a one-time 
savings of more than two million gallons of fuel. 
3. LED Tent Lighting System 
Increased efficiency of lighting is an obvious choice to reduce a power and fuel 
demand for an FOB, every watt that can be saved is less power required. If the power 
supply is JP-8, then that power saving equates to less demand for fuel.  If the fuel is solar, 
improved efficiency of lighting increases the longevity of stored power. At ExFOB 2010-
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1, in March 2010, the Jameson LLC from Clover, South Carolina, demonstrated a line of 
LED lights (see Figure 22) that could be set up in strings, producing enough light to fill 
the necessary tent space. This was a true off-the-shelf solution. The LED lights were 
capable of operating at multiple voltages (110–230 VAC), and had an expected lifespan 
of 50,000 hours. The light had three operating modes (blackout, low, high), which has a 
power draw range of 14–27W. The LED lighting system would draw 25–60% over 
traditional lighting systems in use by the USMC. Initially the USMC bought 1,760 light 
kits and immediately had them shipped to Afghanistan for use and evaluation. The cost of 
the initial R&D cost to the ExFOB was $136,000 (Jameson, LLC, 2014). Currently the 
USMC is evaluating a LED lighting system produced by Techshot Lighting of Floyds 
Knobs, IN. The system is similar, promising 30–60 percent reduction in power 
requirements. The Techshot system is a hanging light system where the LED lights hang 
down from a power cord instead of being strung up from the ceiling for support. The 
Techshot light also claims to offer “better” light and a 50,000–100,000 hour life cycle. It 
has only two modes, normal and blackout, that draw 3–10W of power. The new lights 
meet MIL-STD compliance to water resistance, EMI and thermal operating ranges and 
cargo vibration (Techshot Lighting, LLC, 2014). 
 
Figure 22.  LED Lights (from K. Hanson, personal communication,  
December 16, 2013)  
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a. Timeline 
 March 2010—ExFOB 2010-1 MCB Quantico, VA SPACES 
demonstrated.  
 November 2010—Urgent Statement of Need signed. 
 December 2010—Acquisition Decision Memorandum signed (K. Hanson, 
personal communication, December 16, 2013; MCSC, 2014a). 
b. Measure of Performance 
Evaluating the acquisition of the LED lights in terms of both the contributions of 
the individual system and the ExFOB process toward reducing expeditionary energy use. 
 
(1) Contribution of LED Lights.  For planning expeditionary facilities for a 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a key point is the amount of housing that will be required 
for the 17,000 Marines deployed to the field. Using FM 3.34-400 as a guideline, there 
will need to be 1,288,600 sq. ft. of tents to adequately house everyone (U.S Army HQ, 
2008). In order to meet the MIL-STD requirement for indoor lighting, Techshot (which 
manufactures the LED lights used by the Marines) recommends using one LED light per 
25 sq. ft. of shelter space. This recommendation would require 51,544 lights for the MEB 
shelters. Assuming these shelter lights are on in normal mode (10W, 1000 lumens), 
comparing the power requirement for the LED lights vs. incandescent bulbs (60W, 
840 lumens), Equations 6 and 7 demonstrate that the LED lights use 2,629 kW less than 
incandescent bulbs.  
LED Lights: 51,544 lights  10W
light
 515,440 W = 515.4kW       
(6)
 
 Incandescent Lights: 51,544 lights 60W
light
 3,092,640 W = 3,093 kW  
(7)
 
Making this swap to LED lights enables the Marines to remove 26 100kW 
generators off the battlefield and save nearly 1.8 million gallons of fuel for those 
generators (see Equation 8). Considering the second order savings of 7 gallons of fuel 
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used to deliver each gallon of generator fuel, to total rises to 14.3 million gallons of saved 
fuel each year. 






1,787,916 gal year (saved)
  (8)
 
(2) Contribution of the ExFOB.  The LED lighting system was evaluated at 
ExFOB 2010-1 in March of 2010 and purchased using an acquisition decision 
memorandum (ADM) in December of 2010: a process requiring nine months in total. The 
speed of the ExFOB evaluation process meant that the LED lights were procured 15 
months faster than the COTS average. Assuming the same use rate from above, this 
reduced acquisition timeline saved the Marine Corps more than 2.2 million gallons of 
fuel that would have been wasted by older systems being used while waiting for a slower 
acquisition process.  
4. Insulating Liner 
An obvious improvement that could reduce power demands on USMC 
expeditionary bases was heating and cooling requirements. By their nature, tents are not 
efficient at regulating temperatures and with the need for computers on the battlefield the 
importance of temperature is not only a comfort factor for troops, but a necessity for the 
electronics. At ExFOB 2010-1, HDT Global (a company producing expeditionary 
shelters for the Marine Corps) demonstrated a tent liner (see Figure 23) that could be put 
in between the outer and inner layers of tactical USMC tents. The layer was lightweight 
and served both heating and cooling needs (MCSC, 2014b). The barrier would maintain 
desired temperatures, holding in heat in low temperature environments and holding in 
cool air and reflecting heat when external temperatures are high. The insulating liner 
effectively doubled the insulating capacity of the tents increasing their “R” value from 
two (R2) to four (R4). The radiant barrier liner meets MIL-STD requirements for flame 
resistance and various other requirements (K. Hanson, personal communication, 
December 16, 2013). The USMC bought 800 of the tent liners without any RDT&E cost 
to the ExFOB (K. Hanson, personal communication, December 16, 2013). 
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Figure 23.  Shelter Liners (from K. Hanson, personal communication, 
December 16, 2013) 
a. Timeline 
 March 2010—ExFOB 2010-1 MCB Quantico, VA, SPACES 
demonstrated.  
 September 2010—Urgent Statement of Need signed. 
 October 2010—Acquisition Decision Memorandum signed (K. Hanson, 
personal communication, December 16, 2013; MCSC, 2014b) 
b. Measure of Performance 
Evaluating the acquisition of the Shelter Liners in terms of both the contributions 
of the individual system and the ExFOB process toward reducing expeditionary energy 
use. 
 
(1) Contribution of Shelter Liners.  During 2009, in Afghanistan Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan (MEB-A) was using 28,500 gallons of fuel per day to 
 69
generate electricity (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab [MCWL], 2010). Assuming this 
electricity is being produced by 100kW generators (each using 7.85 gal/hr of fuel), then 












In a 2009 study, the Marines found that approximately 75 percent of the 
electricity generated was being used to power HVAC systems in inefficient structures, 
such as the tents that make up most FOBs (Vavrin, 2010). This means that roughly 
11.3MW of the total generated power is used for air conditioning.  
The total heat transfer into or out of a structure (which must be managed by an 
HVAC system) is calculated using the formula in Equation 10, where Q is the heat 
transfer, A is the surface area of the structure, R is the insulation value, ∆T is the 






The shelter liners evaluated by the ExFOB increase the R-value of expeditionary 
shelters from 2 to 4 (K. Hanson, personal communication, December 16, 2013). 
Reviewing Equation 10, it is easy to see that by doubling the R-value, the amount of 
heating/cooling capacity required in a given environment is cut in half. Reducing the 
heating/cooling requirements has multiple upstream benefits: first, half of the HVAC 
units could be taken out of theater (or never deployed at all); second, removing half of the 
HVAC electrical load (~5.7MW) means that 56 100kW generators are unnecessary, 
which will save nearly 3,851,000 gallons of fuel per year; and third, by not having to 
deliver that fuel to FOBs the Marines will save a total of 30,800,000 gallons per year 
(Vavrin, 2010). 
(2) Contribution of the ExFOB.  The shelter liners are another program that 
benefitted from the ExFOB’s accelerated timeline. From their initial demo at ExFOB 
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2010-1 until their procurement in October 2010, there were only seven months from start 
to finish. By getting the liners purchased 15 months ahead of the typical COTS schedule, 
the ExFOB potentially saved the Marine Corps nearly 4.8 million gallons of fuel being 
used to cool FOB tents.  
C. PHASE THREE: VALUE ANALYSIS 
In this phase, the ExFOB is analyzed using KVA theory to answer the research 
question: Is the ExFOB value added to the USMC? KVA theory is generally used to 
assess whether steps in an organizational process add value or are wasteful to a product 
(Housel & Bell, 2001). These steps or points of analysis are value centers. For the 
purpose of this analysis, the value centers are used to assess value added by the ExFOB 
to acquisition processes. 
This analysis uses ten value centers that were developed in the NPS thesis 
Assessing the Value of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell by Middleton (2006). The value 
centers were determined to be vital to rapid acquisition and the acquisition community 
(Middleton, 2006). Additionally, “without these centers, rapid initiatives … would not be 
successful in meeting the warfighters’ immediate needs” (Middleton, 2006). The value 
centers contribute to a faster acquisition process when the knowledge is included into the 
acquisition community. Although the ExFOB is not an acquisition organization, the value 
centers can be used analogously because the ExFOB serves to accelerate the acquisition 
of expeditionary energy solutions for the USMC. 
The value centers were slightly adjusted to fit the ExFOB more appropriately. The 
approach to this analysis is an objective view of each value center with no assumption of 
value. The value centers are further grouped into measuring the movement of a need 
through the acquisition process and methods used by the ExFOB. The last value center 
considers the ExFOB’s suitability compared to other processes in solving future 
expeditionary energy requirements. 
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1. Speed  
Speed is an essential part of acquisition depending on the situation. As seen in 
Phase One of the analysis, the rapid acquisition processes have fast duration times from 
identifying a need to fielding a solution. There is no set timeline for each process except 
for the REF as referenced in Figure 6. Most processes complete the task as quickly as 
possible. 
The ExFOB does not have a set timeline for finding an expeditionary energy 
solution, but parts of the process are deliberate. The demonstration phase is designed to 
be one week, and the technology demonstration/engineering evaluation is about a month. 
The field evaluation phase, which is the most important, is not on a set timeline. This 
overall tempo does help to keep the process moving. Although the ExFOB is not trying to 
identify solutions immediately, it is important for the ExFOB to move fast. It must move 
fast because the USMC is on a timeline to meet certain energy requirements by years 
2015, 2020, and ultimately 2025 (Figure 1). Also, technology is rapidly developing in the 
energy field so the faster a solution is selected and fielded, the more benefit to the 
USMC. Finally, the ExFOB can also be used to find UUNS solutions. UUNS by nature is 
supposed to meet an immediate need for the warfighter. As such, the ExFOB process can 
be tailored accordingly to meet those needs. 
The speed of the ExFOB is valuable to the USMC and DOD because it identifies 
solutions faster than the traditional acquisition process. The speed of the RDT&E then 
leads to a faster fielding of the capability. And, again, the ability to find UUNS solutions 
makes the ExFOB extremely valuable to the current needs of the USMC and not just 
long-term needs.  
The ExFOB not having a set timeline and having a semiannual schedule is not 
value added in the short term. For example, the ExFOB finding UUNS solutions does not 
provide the end users with a time frame in which a solution will be found. The REF 
conversely advertises a set time to find solutions. It finds energy solutions just as the 
ExFOB does and with what appears to be equal quality. The REF also does not have a set 
schedule to start a project. This incentivizes the movement to find a solution and provides 
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expectation to the warfighter. The ExFOB is only one step in the acquisition process so 
flexibility and goals for the short term will add value. 
2. Budgetary Options  
Funding drives everything in the DOD. As phase one highlighted, resourcing in 
the DOD is a very deliberate and lengthy process, mainly because the DOD is so large. 
The more funding available, the more the service or organization can do. Similarly, the 
more budgetary options available, the more the USMC as well as the ExFOB can do. The 
ExFOB has a baseline RDT&E budget as well as O&M budget. 
The ExFOB appears to use funds from UUNS when finding an UUNS solution. 
This is value added because it allows the ExFOB to do more than what is planned using 
the baseline budgets. The REF is very similar in that it can handle UONS which comes 
with access to other funding. The more access the ExFOB has to funding, the faster it can 
help meet the USMC energy goals. 
3. Streamlined Bureaucracy 
Every large organization has a bureaucracy, and the DOD is no exception. Even at 
the USMC level, it exists, and it inherently slows down any process. The rapid 
acquisition processes were created to circumvent most of the bureaucracy to expedite 
capabilities to the warfighter. Similarly, the E2O was established to handle all USMC 
expeditionary energy matters. 
The E2O and ExFOB process have added value to the DOD by streamlining how 
the USMC and the DOD approach energy issues. The ExFOB specifically streamlined 
how the USMC handles expeditionary energy solutions by leveraging industry and other 
sources. The non-value added aspect of E2O and ExFOB is that the bureaucracy is now 
larger.  
4. Focus 
Rapid acquisition in each service is handled by the regular acquisition staff. The 
only exception to this is the REF because it is a stand-alone organization within the Army 
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and resourced accordingly (Middleton, 2006). Consequently, the regular acquisition staff 
is taxed with the additional duties to meet urgent needs.  
E2O and ExFOB process are value added because they are an established 
organization and process with one focus—expeditionary energy. Energy, in general, is a 
top priority for the DOD and is now an integral part of everything Marines do. The E2O 
is staffed to focus on this priority and shape future USMC capabilities through the 
ExFOB and other means.  
5. Wider Portfolio Balance 
All acquisition processes consist of three components: requirements, resourcing, 
and acquisition (Chyma, 2010). Each service has its own version of these components 
specifically designed to equip the service according to its required capabilities. In terms 
of requirements, if they are applicable to each service, then the JCIDS process is used. 
Since energy affects more than one service, the JCIDS process applies and has 
implications for all services. For example, many land-based energy requirements for the 
Army are the same as the USMC. 
The ExFOB adds value by solving expeditionary energy requirements for more 
than just the USMC. The PORs for the USMC could be used by the Army if desired. The 
ICD is evidence of the joint process and serves as the basis of each ExFOB. There is 
good collaboration between the Army and USMC on expeditionary energy initiatives so 
duplication of efforts is minimized.  
6. Alignment with Acquisition Strategy 
Acquisition process changes in the last decade have made DOD acquisition more 
efficient. JCIDS was a direct result of these changes and led to DOD’s top-down 
approach compared to the services’ old bottom-up approach. The result is better 
collaboration as pointed out in the wider portfolio section.  
E2O and the ExFOB were born out this new joint concept and ExFOB adds value 
because it aligns with acquisition strategy. Although it is at the USMC level, the ExFOB 
seeks to provide universal expeditionary energy solutions. USMC does not procure 
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solutions for other services but shares the information. This is particularly important in a 
fiscally-constrained environment. The ExFOB also leverages industries’ knowledge by 
soliciting COTS products. This method saves DOD considerably in RDT&E costs and 
aligns with new acquisition initiatives of buying COTS—both adding value. There could 
be a tendency to find USMC-only solutions, which would be non-value added, since the 
ExFOB’s primary goal is to meet the USMC expeditionary energy requirements. 
7. Impartiality 
As mentioned previously, acquisition at the USMC level always has the potential 
for service bias. This also applies across the board with rapid acquisition since these 
organizations are service-specific except for the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. E2O and 
the ExFOB are predisposed to this bias but are impartial when it comes to expeditionary 
energy. 
The ExFOB potentially does not add value to joint solutions if it solicits purely 
USMC requirements. However, the requirements were determined through the JCIDS 
process with other services represented, so there was value at least in that part of the 
process. This value center is likely least important since other services have organizations 
fulfilling their specific needs but will add value with collaboration.  
8. Life-Cycle Costs 
Inherent in rapid acquisition solutions is the concern of long-term sustainability 
and life-cycle costs (Middleton, 2006). It is a concern because rapid solutions are funded 
for an immediate wartime need and not programmed using PPBE. This is appropriate 
because the need may only be for the short term and not required in the long term. The 
requirement at some point is evaluated in the JCIDS process to determine whether it 
should be programmed or cancelled. At this point, the life-cycle costs are considered. 
The ExFOB is value added in this regard because the materiel solutions become 
programs of record. This is attributed to the ExFOB in conjunction with the traditional 
acquisition process of finding solutions and then handing them to MCSC to formalize the 
requirement through PPBE and DAS. In doing this, training and life-cycle costs are 
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budgeted. In the cases where the ExFOB in conjunction with UUNS is used for materiel 
solutions, the life-cycle costs are not a concern and not value added. Because the ExFOB 
uses a thorough RDT&E process, the materiel solution is deemed to be the best available 
to meet USMC expeditionary energy requirements and is program ready, regardless of 
the acquisition process. Therefore, life-cycle costs are easy to ascertain.   
9. Feedback 
Most rapid acquisition processes lack a good feedback mechanism from the end 
user. The only exception appears to be the REF because REF personnel go forward with 
the end users to evaluate the product’s effectiveness (Middleton, 2006). Traditional 
acquisition does not have this problem because items are thoroughly tested prior to 
procurement. 
The ExFOB is value added in this regard because it also conducts thorough 
RDT&E. During the field evaluation phase, the materiel solution is tested in a real-world 
environment and feedback is provided accordingly. Also in some instances, ExFOB 
personnel accompany the equipment as part of the testing process. The manufacturers 
make changes based on the feedback, which leads to a better capability and developed 
requirement.   
10. Evolving Nature of War 
The evolving nature of war considers the challenges faced by the future 
warfighter. The future fights are likely not large conventional wars, but the DOD has 
historically manned, trained, and equipped itself for such wars. The DOD in the future 
needs to be lighter, faster, and more agile. Commensurately, the acquisition processes 
must change to respond to the future needs. For example, the REF was created for this 
purpose, and even if only considering energy solutions, it rapidly serves the warfighter. 
Although many improvements have been made, there is more to be done. 
E2O and the ExFOB are value added in this regard because ExFOB is a faster and 
non-traditional process. E2O and the ExFOB are also concerned with expeditionary 
energy solutions, which is truly the evolution of warfare. Of course, rapid acquisition 
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processes are also able to field solutions to the warfighter and are equally value added. 
The ExFOB is not value added in its deliberate, semi-annual process in that it does not 
provide as much flexibility even when fulfilling an UUNS.  
D. SUMMARY 
The ExFOB program has successfully reduced the acquisition timeline, averaging 
approximately one year from demonstration to POR (when fulfilling requests generated 
by UUNS). Because of the speed of their process and their ability to rapidly evaluate and 
field test emerging technologies, the ExFOB has saved the Marine Corps nearly 24,000 
gallons of fuel per day. 
The value centers serve to highlight vital areas in acquisition processes. The 
knowledge gained in these areas through this analysis ultimately contributes to faster 
acquisition processes when included into the acquisition community. There were many 
value-added aspects of the ExFOB and a few non value-added ones. Applying this 
knowledge will improve acquisition processes and enable the Marines to continue to 
improve their energy efficiency. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This project examined the contribution of the ExFOB program toward the USMC 
goal of reducing expeditionary energy use by 50 percent by 2025. The approach used was 
that of a comparative analysis of the ExFOB process relative to other acquisition 
processes, both rapid acquisition and traditional acquisition processes used within the 
DOD in order to measure the effectiveness of the ExFOB process and products toward 
reducing energy use, and evaluate the ExFOB’s value to the Marine Corps. Overall, this 
project assessed the ExFOB’s contribution toward a 50 percent reduction in Marine 
Corps expeditionary energy consumption, by answering the following three questions: 
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the ExFOB 
program within different acquisition processes? 
2. What are the contributions of the ExFOB programs and process? 
3. Is the ExFOB value added to the USMC?  
The analysis of the ExFOB was performed in three phases. The first phase 
analyzed the ExFOB from a “big picture” perspective as part of a process and how it 
functioned within the acquisition process as a whole. This analysis looked broadly at 
requirements, resourcing, and acquisition to answer the research question: What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the ExFOB program within different 
acquisition processes? 
The advantages of the ExFOB in requirements determination are twofold. First, 
with traditional acquisition, it accelerates the process with its streamlined RDT&E. The 
ExFOB takes the requirement from the ICD, selects a COTS solution, develops a 
requirement and re-inserts the requirement into the JCIDS process to be programmed 
faster than following the traditional process. Using UUNS, this entire process is much 
faster because requirements determination before the ExFOB is expedited. Additionally, 
using UUNS, there is no immediate requirements review because JCIDS and PPBE are 
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bypassed until a later review. The ExFOB requirements development process, however, 
is exactly the same. 
The disadvantages of the ExFOB in requirements determination deals mostly with 
the ExFOB process itself. The process is chartered for semiannual events, which makes it 
less flexible. Although this is aligned with a long-term view of meeting USMC energy 
goals, flexibility may be needed to speed up the process or meet emerging requirements. 
Additionally, the ExFOB process seems to be set in time duration regardless of the 
urgency of the need. Compared to other acquisition organizations, not accelerating the 
ExFOB process and providing a time frame to find a materiel solution are disadvantages 
for the end user.  
Advantages of resourcing for the ExFOB occur when using UUNS. Although this 
is not a direct function of the ExFOB, more funding allows for additional items to be 
tested during the ExFOB and faster acquisition once the ExFOB is complete. The ExFOB 
saves a significant amount of RDT&E funding and time by leveraging industry 
technology in COTS products.  
Disadvantages of resourcing for the ExFOB are directly related to working in 
conjunction with traditional resourcing. The traditional resourcing provides a set amount 
of O&M and RDT&E funding. Finding expeditionary energy solutions at the ExFOB 
seems to be mainly limited by the amount of funding.  
Advantages of acquisition for the ExFOB also relate to the process in which it 
works. Using UUNS, systems can be acquired by the USMC immediately following 
requirements development. This seems to be a key advantage since energy technology is 
rapidly changing and there is a trade-off between time to procure it and technology 
relevance. In general, the ExFOB as part of the traditional acquisition process makes the 
process faster over the aggregate. 
A disadvantage of acquisition for the ExFOB is associated with the traditional 
acquisition process. Although ExFOB does increase the overall speed from identifying 
the need to fielding, the overall process is still much slower and time-intensive compared 
to rapid acquisition processes.  
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The advantages and disadvantages highlighted above mainly revolve around the 
purpose or intent of the energy need. The energy need may be short term or long term, so 
how the need is met is important. Expeditionary energy needs are an inextricable part of 
the USMC and a huge undertaking. The more flexibility and resources the E2O and the 
ExFOB have, the more successful they will be to meet any expeditionary energy needs.    
The second phase quantified the contribution of the programs the ExFOB has 
evaluated and helped the USMC procure. Using MEB-A’s 2010 fuel consumption in 
Afghanistan of 88,749 gallons per day as a baseline, the estimated fuel savings generated 
by four programs (GREENS, SPACES, LED Lights, and Shelter Liners) were calculated. 
By 2016, when SPACES reaches FOC, there will be the potential to save 23,651 gallons 
per day (8,632,716 gallons per year). Figure 24 shows combined fuel savings (in red) 
compared to the USMC long-term goal of a 50 percent reduction in expeditionary energy 
by 2025. So far there has been excellent progress in meeting the 2025 energy goal, and 
future capability improvements will continue to keep the USMC on track. It is important 
to note that this table assumes 100 percent utilization of new capabilities and 
discontinuing the use of the outdated equipment (i.e., when GREENS are installed at an 




Figure 24.  Progress Toward 2025 Expeditionary Energy Reduction 
In addition to the fuel savings generated by new equipment, the amount of fuel 
saved by the expedited ExFOB process was also calculated. The annual fuel savings of 
each capability was compared with how quickly it was purchased via the ExFOB vice the 
traditional two-year COTS timeline and the time saved was translated into fuel saved on 
the battlefield. In total, because of the speed of their process, the ExFOB saved the 
Marine Corps more than 9.9 million gallons of fuel.  
To date, several material solutions have been evaluated in the field, four of which 
have been transitioned to PORs and addressed at least eight of the E2W2 ICD capability 
gaps (K. Hanson, personal communication, December 16, 2013). We have shown that 
these four PORs could be expected to save millions of gallons of fuel per year. This fuel 
savings means that fewer vulnerable resupply convoys are needed. In addition to the 
outright fuel savings (and the associated monetary savings), less need for convoys 
translates directly to less risk to our national treasure, specifically USMC lives and 
equipment. The USMC proved the effectiveness of these PORs with a field test. In 2010, 
India Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment utilized ExFOB technologies at 
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multiple bases and had 90 percent less fuel consumption (USMC E2O, 2013) than 
similarly-sized FOBs using standard equipment. This 90 percent reduction was achieved 
surprisingly quickly and demonstrates that the USMC can realistically achieve its desired 
expeditionary fuel goals in the timeline that has been put forth. Using the current 
technology provided by the ExFOB, the Marines have nearly reached the goal of an 
energy-independent FOB and are making good progress toward the 2025 goal. 
The third phase was a value-added analysis. Using KVA theory, ten value centers 
were analyzed to answer the following research question: Is the ExFOB value added to 
the USMC? The value centers indicate that the ExFOB is a value-added process overall. 
There were more value added points than non-value added points. This is not to say the 
process is perfect and serves to highlight a number of improvement areas or best 
practices, which are included in the Recommendations section. 
By accelerating the selection, test, and evaluation processes, the ExFOB has 
reduced the acquisition time of four energy-saving technologies, saving approximately 
one year off of the two-year COTS process. The fuel saved by the speed of the ExFOB 
process and the capabilities they have helped acquire have the potential to reduce 
expeditionary energy use by more than 26 percent by 2016 and keep the Marine Corps on 
track to meet its 2025 goal. These improvements to the acquisition process, timeline, and 
expeditionary capabilities of the USMC, coupled with the value added by the ExFOB 
program, demonstrate that is instrumental to helping the Marine Corps reduce their 
expeditionary energy consumption while improving their ability to conduct sustained 
operations from the sea. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations formulated here aim to serve to improve the ExFOB 
process based on the analysis and findings of this study. Although the benefit and added 
value of the ExFOB clearly outweigh its costs, some areas of improvement were 
highlighted particularly when comparing it to other processes.  
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1. Issue: Increasing the ExFOB Responsiveness to USMC Requirements 
The ExFOB by design is a semi-annual venue to identify, evaluate, and accelerate 
material solutions to fulfill USMC expeditionary energy capability gaps (USMC HQ, 
2012). This concept was born out of the USMC expeditionary energy strategy, which has 
a long-term view to meet these capability gaps and increase energy efficiency. The 
USMC strategy outlines expeditionary goals by years 2015, 2020, and 2025. From the 
analysis, the E2O and the ExFOB appear to be on pace to meet these requirements. 
However, some of the time gain in the process was the ExFOB being used in conjunction 
with UUNS in order to field material solutions rapidly. Since UUNS will not likely be 
part of the long-term plan, and the ExFOB aligned with the traditional acquisition process 
will be much slower, more flexibility in using the ExFOB is required. Conducting more 
ExFOBs, or possibly less, will allow the E2O flexibility to accelerate or slow down 
expeditionary energy materiel solutions based on meeting the energy goals as required. 
Also, if the ExFOB is periodically used in conjunction with UUNS, then an ExFOB can 
be immediately conducted to find a materiel solution, which is more aligned with the 
purpose of an UUNS. 
a. Recommendation  
Resource and change the ExFOB charter to allow more flexibility. The guidance 
can remain semiannual with a caveat of adjusting as required to meet emergent or long-
term USMC needs. These changes will align better with long-term goals and ultimately 
increase ExFOB responsiveness to USMC requirements. 
2. Issue: ExFOB Budget Only Provides Funding for Test and Evaluation 
The ExFOB’s four successful programs (GREENS, SPACES, Shelter Liners, and 
LED lights) have enabled the Marine Corps forces conducting expeditionary operations 
to save up to 8.6 million gallons of fuel every year. Additionally, because of the time 
saved by the ExFOB evaluation process, the Marines were able to save an additional 9.9 
million gallons of fuel by quickly getting efficient technologies to the field. During 
wartime, the ExFOB was able to take advantage of the UUNS process and the (relatively) 
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ready access to funding. As the conflict in Afghanistan draws to a close and UUNS 
funding becomes less available, the ExFOB will need continued supplemental funding to 
enable them to continue to rapidly get new capabilities to the USMC fleet. 
a. Recommendation 
Establish a discretionary budget for the ExFOB to use to rapidly procure new 
capabilities and to quickly take advantage of the cycle of continuous improvements in 
terms of efficiency, cost, and performance. Like the UUNS process, capabilities that are 
purchased with this discretionary budget could then be subject to review using the UNS 
process and either adopted as a POR or discarded after their initial purchase. 
3. Issue: ExFOB Faces a Race Against Rapid Technology Advancement 
Energy technology is a massive growth industry due to many factors including 
energy security, climate change concerns, and desires and requirements to be off-the-grid. 
Further growth and capability of energy products is likely to continue. The ExFOB has 
demonstrated that in a short amount of time, with limited budget requirements they can 
assemble a FOB with 90 percent fuel reduction.  
a. Recommendation  
The ExFOB should look for short-term solutions to their long-term goals and 
focus on multiple means of attacking the energy problem. Conservation and decreasing 
demand through small innovations and technologies combined with improved 
technologies on the generation and storage side are a proven method to decrease fuel 
energy required in theater and increase USMC expeditionary capability. Any technology-
related material solution the USMC chooses to invest heavily in may likely be overpriced 
or outdated by the time it reaches FOC. Examples of this can be seen in both the 
GREENS and SPACES systems: within two years of their IOC, each system had follow-
on versions that offered more capability. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
While conducting this project, we identified areas of potential further research. 
One area deals with the life cycle or longevity of energy products. Since energy solutions 
are rapidly improving, a cost-benefit analysis on the longevity of certain products (i.e., 
GREENS) or the replacement frequency would help the USMC to better estimate real 
life-cycle costs. It also provides a baseline for product longevity or usefulness.  
Another area of study is an in-depth look at the ExFOB process compared to other 
comparable processes. Our analysis examined the ExFOB from a “big picture” 
perspective to see its effect on the overall acquisition process. This analysis would 
involve analyzing the phases of the ExFOB as compared to other processes to determine 
best practices or areas of inefficiency.   
A third area for follow-on study is an investigation into what extent the USMC 
has changed its operating procedures take advantage of the capabilities provided by the 
ExFOB. The analysis would examine how widely the new capabilities have been 
distributed throughout the Marine Corps units, whether the standard procedure for 
establishing and operating FOBs has been changed to utilize GREENS/SPACES/Shelter 
Liners/LED Lights and other energy-efficient technologies and finally, whether the 




APPENDIX ENERGY PROGRAM DATA 
The following data are from the REF “Edge to Energy” initiatives. Twelve 
initiatives commenced in 2012 and were completed at varying times throughout 2013. 
The data are summarized in Table 14.  
 
Table 14.   Data Summary of REF “Energy to Edge” Initiatives 
The following data are from the USMC ExFOB programs of record (POR). Four 
PORs commenced in March 2010 and were completed at various times. The data are 
summarized in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.   Data Summary of ExFOB PORs 
 
Item Req gen Req received Proj start date Proj validation Delivery Days to ShipTotal time (days)
Net Zero Combat Outpost 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Aug-13 330 497
Lite Camp JTF_B 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Jul-13 300 467
Lite Camp OEF 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Jul-13 300 467
Regenerator T-series 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
Regenerator FORGE 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
Solar Stik 380/400 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
Solar Stik WASP 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
MILSPRAY 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Sep-13 365 532
INI FlexFuel 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
Qinetiq 1kW Genset 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
Qinetiq IWS 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Jun-13 270 437
PM MEP TQGs 77 Jun-12 Sep-12 90 Apr-13 210 377
210 377
Note: REF requirements generation data from (USD [AT&L], 2009, Figure 3) and all other data from (W. Garland, personal communication, January 
29, 2014).
Item Proj start date Proj validation Days to Ship Total time (days)
SPACES Mar-10 90 270 360
GREENS Mar-10 90 390 480
LED Mar-10 90 270 360
Shelter Mar-10 90 210 300
270 360
  Note: Data from (K. Hanson, personal communication, December 16, 2013).
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